REVIEW

The Re-turn to the Other: In Search of New Ontologies of International Relations


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This essay places Carl Schmitt, Anthony Burke, and Louiza Odysseos into critical conversations about the structural relation between global politics and the production of otherness. Burke and Odysseos qualify Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction by rethinking the complex relays between security, subjectivity and ethics.

Once the 2008 US presidential election entered its final weeks, it took an increasingly negative turn through a series of intensified personal attacks by the candidates. Republican contender John McCain, his running mate Sarah Palin and countless surrogates on the right joined forces in a concerted campaign to portray his political opponent Barack Obama as Anti-American, exotic, unsafe, and the Other. As Election Day approached, at a town hall rally McCain found himself pressed to defend Obama as a ‘decent family man’ and ‘citizen’ against allegations that he is an ‘Arab.’ McCain’s response, limited to saying he is not an ‘Arab,’ was booed and jeered by his own supporters and later praised by the media. It was not until former Bush Secretary of State Colin Powell endorsed Obama that an eminent public figure openly questioned what was wrong with being an Arab and why McCain suggested that an ‘Arab’ (or a Muslim) and a decent family man were mutually exclusive.
Over the course of several decades this figure of the Arab as ‘what we are not’ has crystallized as the paradigmatic Other and the civilizational enemy of the West. In this respect, the McCain example points to one instance of the intensification of this tendency under the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror.’ In an antagonistic relation to a ‘packaged’ set of differences (non-Christian, irrational, immoral, violence-prone, fanatic, backward), American national identity has been consolidated and a series of unpopular and often illegal security-related policies have been formulated. Islam has been associated with holy war, male domination, and terrorism, and the Arab has appeared as the perennial aggressor in a monumental ‘clash of civilizations,’ as a suicide bomber, hijacker, or oily sheikh who sponsors terrorist networks. The items on these lists are interchangeable, functioning as metonymic substitutes in this discursive matrix of othering. Economies of otherness such as these have become structural features of international relations. They work to transform cultural into ontological differences and present the latter as signs of pathology and lack.

This propensity to convert difference into Otherness to address the threat of our constitutive heteronomy and to assure the certainty of hegemonic identities—exhibited by us both individually and collectively—is not new (Connolly, 2002). It has structured the ontological premises of a long tradition of Western thought, including much of modern social science in debates about security, violence, colonialism, conflict, war and coexistence. Yet, in spite of the legacy of some key texts in philosophy, political theory and psychoanalysis, interrogating the self in relation to the Other (Hegel, Lacan, Sartre, Levinas, Foucault, Derrida, Butler, Taylor, Connolly), recently the effaced and silenced Other has ‘spoken out’ in the field of international relations. This has occurred through critical engagements such as postcolonial scholarship (Fanon, 1967; Bhabha, 1994; Said, 1979), feminist approaches to international relations (Enloe, 2000; Gatens, 1996; Peterson, 1992; Sylvester, 2002; Tickner, 1992), peace and conflict studies (Galtung, 1990), and poststructuralist approaches to security studies (Campbell, 1998; Dalby, 1990; Dillon, 1989, 1996; Walker, 1988, 1995). What is at stake for this diverse set of theorists is that most IR discussions of the complex relays between security, identity and ethics are overlaid with a discourse that conceptualizes the Other in terms of a two pole relation of the same and the other, identity and otherness, which tend to slide into one another. On the one hand, this discourse positions the stranger and the foreigner as a threatening, underdeveloped, ‘primitive’ and inferior being whose voice can be silenced and whose knowledge and humanity can be denied on the grounds of this inferiority. On the other hand, the Other is conceived as potentially amenable to the universal possibility already lodged in Europe. The dehumanized Other is either sacrificed or reinserted into Western civilization and the global politico-economic order through technologies of colonization, modernization, development, democratization, etc. Such modes of construction of otherness enable systems of exploitation exercised in the name of security and a
geopolitics designed to contain the allegedly anarchical and dangerous space of international politics.

The new expanded edition of *The Concept of the Political*, by Carl Schmitt, *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other*, by Anthony Burke, and *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations*, by Louiza Odysseos are three books that each, to different degrees and from different vantage points, engages this complex figuration of the Other. George Schwab’s translation of the original 1932 edition of *The Concept of the Political* includes Schmitt’s 1929 essay ‘The age of neutralizations and depoliticizations,’ a thoughtful foreword by Tracy Strong, and critical notes by Leo Strauss. It highlights Schmitt’s presentation of the self-other approach, in which the construction of a friend/enemy distinction serves as the condition of possibility of politics, security and national unity. Both Burke and Odysseos carry the Schmittian imperative to its limit. They seek to rethink Otherness by problematizing the ontological commitments of international relations theory, in terms of security and the centrality of modern subjectivity, respectively. Burke’s subtle theoretical work enables the Other of security to find its way back in through a new ethic of transnational responsibility and reciprocity, which undermines the modern architectonic of sovereignty and the state. Odysseos, in turn, argues that this intersubjectivity, heteronomy and interdependence between Being and the world has always been there, whether we theorize it or not. IR literature in particular has overlooked the primacy of this interinvolvement. Read together, these three books will inform scholars working at the intersection of identity politics, critical security studies and global ethics.

The revival of academic attention to the political thought of Carl Schmitt in international relations in recent years has been largely associated with its notable engagement by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2005) in his work on the intersection of the state of exception, law, sovereignty, and biopolitics. With the Bush presidency and its global ‘war on terror,’ interest in Schmitt has continued to grow. The new issue of *The Concept of the Political* explores the relationship between politics, ethics, democracy, liberalism and the significance of the identification of an ‘enemy’ as the authentic political form of state legitimation. In the book Schmitt voices his concern that the experience of the political, a field of ultimate authority and final sovereign decision-making, has been dissolved into the modern conjugation of democracy and liberalism. In his view, this devolution emphasizes never-decisive compromise, moral universalism and procedure over determination, antagonism and struggle; it eventually leads to the depoliticization of the world. Moreover, Schmitt contends that any attempt to save the political through the extension of the state to encompass all domains such as the economy, religion, and culture must collapse into the complete ‘identity of state and society;’ it will blur the lines between public and private interests and render the assertion of a distinct political dimension impossible (2007: 22).
Asserting that ‘the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political,’ Schmitt sets to restore the political ‘by discovering and defining the specifically political categories’ through a ‘simple criterion:’ that ‘the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy’ (2007: 19, 25-6). The friend/enemy antithesis of the political ‘denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation’ (2007: 26). It defines politics as a certain mode of relationality to others where the Other can at any time become enemy and stranger: ‘The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly … But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible’ (2007: 27).

Out of this avowedly ‘simple criterion’ emerges a complex and nuanced understanding of the figure of the Other as the enemy. On the one hand, this distinction is actualized only in ‘the extreme case’ of conflict, in the state of exception to the norm. Furthermore, in this sense, it is of key importance that the enemy ‘is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general’ or the ‘private adversary whom one hates: ‘An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship’ (2007: 28). Hence, the collective nature of the friend-enemy grouping, based upon the political principle of such ‘intense and extreme’ antagonism, denies liberal claims to speak in the name of humanity and the possibility of convergence of humanity’s interests into any mode of universal rationality (2007: 29, 54). The enemy is both decided upon by the state and constitutive of a being that takes the form of a shared commitment to a homogeneous form of national identity. The enemy as such is outside the state.

On the other hand, Schmitt insists that ‘the extreme case appears to be an exception does not negate its decisive character but confirms it all the more’ and that ‘the high points of politics are simultaneously the moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy’ (2007: 35, 67). In effect, the stakes of politics are so high that ‘each participant is in a position to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own form of existence’ (2007: 27). What follows then, is that responsibility is best conceived as a mode of being that is related to the preservation of the state, which can be transcended only through the existential identification and negation of the Other as an enemy. In the process, politics becomes a defining characteristic of what is to be human; to diminish the political and lose the enemy means to diminish the clarity of belonging to a state that is essential to human existence. Finally, in spite of Schmitt’s assertion that ‘the definition of the political suggested here neither favors war nor militarism, neither imperialism
nor pacifism,’ the ‘real possibility of physical killing’ and the potential for war and fighting persist as the most salient feature of the human condition: ‘What always matters is the possibility of the extreme case taking place, the real war, and the decision whether this situation has or has not arrived’ (2007: 33, 35). This concrete and real possibility of war is absolutely critical to the organization of the domain of politics: ‘a world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated … would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics’ (2007: 35).

Schmitt’s concept of the political may be called into question on multiple grounds. I will mention three of them here. First, simultaneously a strength and weakness, his simple and lucid articulation of the political reduces it to a one-dimensional antithesis of friend and enemy, conceptually distinct from other domains such as culture, the economy, and religion. Such a simplification remains highly controversial and radically insufficient to account for the complex, multi-faceted and relational nature of international politics. Second, despite Schmitt’s claim that, as a precondition for engaging with the political, existential conflict and the moment of identification of/against Otherness do not presuppose hatred of an enemy, the relationship to the friend seems to be compromised by the very clarity of the enemy. In fact, it is ambivalent who or what the friend is apart from that which may turn into the Other and the enemy or gets incorporated in the self. The fact that the Other is encountered conceptually as an enemy structures to a significant extent expectations of how future encounters will unfold. After all, there is no clear reason provided by Schmitt why the Other cannot be thought as a peace-minded stranger, exceeding the bounds of national unity rather than someone whose ‘potential’ to pose a threat to one’s very mode of being is always so imminent. Finally, a related question may be raised with regard to Schmitt’s passionate and even aggressive form of writing. His mode of writing promotes affective dispositions on the part of the reader that he attributes to the necessity of the state. Perhaps, it can be described as the intensification of the possibility of conflict through writing itself. Schmitt creates a certain aura of a state of emergency of interpretation that parallels and aggravates his insistence on a set of ontological premises of politics, permeated by existential insecurity and ever-present danger of war.

Nevertheless, introducing The Concept of the Political to more students of international relations, philosophy and the social sciences in general is of high exegetical value as the text renders explicit a range of implicit and often uncritically accepted assumptions of Western political theory. In particular, within the field of international relations, it draws attention to the building block of realist ontologies of the state of nature, structured by the Schmittian imperative of survival and the relational schema of simultaneous identification and effacement of Otherness always already at play.
This view is shared by Anthony Burke, who in *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War against the Other* contends that when Schmitt articulated his ‘vision of “collectivities” of friends and enemies engaged in an existential struggle for survival in the international realm,’ he accentuated an entrenched system of western security thought (2007: 14). This system is rooted in the political ‘economy of sameness’ and the ‘negative imagination of the Other,’ within which the works of Hobbes, Locke and Bentham can be identified as the most prominent examples (2007: 39). Specifically, Hobbes and Locke ‘conceived the modern political community, driven by a desire for security, as an organic unity of sovereign and subject constituted by a primal existential estrangement from the Other of the criminal, the subversive, the Indian and the minority – directly incorporating an image of violence, otherness and fear into the very basis of modern political life’ (2007: 14). In other words, the constitution of modern notions of sovereignty often relies on the subsumption and suppression of a number of linguistic, cultural and social differences; its unity and completeness is attained through the discursive construction of the Other as a figure of security’s outside: ‘As the image of conflict is seemingly eliminated from the inside of the sovereign body, it is reconstituted as its essential and threatening outside, its very condition of possibility and thus its interior’ (2007: 39).

Burke traces this complex web of rhetorical forces that form the negative image of the Other to Hobbes’ divisions between the commonwealth and the state of nature, reason and unreason, criminal and society, savage and civilized man; to Locke’s backward Indian who failed to exploit the earth through labor in opposition to the rationality and industriousness of Western man; and to Bentham’s notion of progress as ‘movement away from a “savage”, non-economic Other’ (2007: 39-40, 46). This is how, according to Burke, by the beginning of the 19th century ‘the temporal possibility for the modern economy and civilization was thus secured by a long chain of oppositions.’ All the elements of the ontological architecture of security – ‘sovereignty, the Other, geopolitics, economic man – were in place and finding productive new articulations’ (2007: 41, 46).

In this respect, gender is another ‘repressed organizing principle’ for the ‘modern architectonic of security,’ affecting security’s figuration of self and Other (2007: 12, 49). Burke turns to the insights of feminist scholars Ann Tickner (1992) and Christine Sylvester (2002) who argue that global security politics has been dominated by an image of ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ sustained through its antagonistic relation to various representations of devalorized insecure and vulnerable gender identities. From this perspective, another axis, this time between masculine and feminine, is added to Burke’s chain of analogous oppositions. It equates ‘maleness with reason, activity, objective truth and the mind, and woman with passion, passivity, subjective truth and the body – realms and values constructed as perpetually threatening, backward and disruptive’ (2007: 50). Security takes the form of a ‘powerful signifier of an ideal political, economic and cultural order, opposed to “others” designated as inferior or
threatening ... bound into a dependent relation with “insecurity” so it can never escape it – it must continue to produce images of “insecurity” in order to retain meaning’ (2007: 51). Thus, at the individual level, security forms a ‘powerful mechanism of subjectivity,’ enacted through the constant interplay between images of men’s participation in war and battle, a masculine, parochial and protective state, and a feminized citizenry, plagued by existential fear and insecurity. This gendered enactment of subjectivity becomes expressed in realist political discourse about the anarchy of the international system and the necessity of the state as a masculine force: ‘in this discourse ... one that imagines certain economic modes (indigenous or agriculture-based) and forms of identification (sub-state and local) as backward, and often also unstable and threatening ... Order ... becomes analogous to the taming of woman and nature,’ of the feminized and demonized, irrational and emotional Other (2007: 51-2).

Burke’s probe into the gendered constitution of the identity of body-politic around the threat of the Other reveals that at the ontological foundation of the modern architectonic of the nation-state lies a promise of security that is never realized. ‘In short insecurity is the very condition of the nation state as a structure or promise of Being’ (2007: 5). Burke identifies two interrelated aporias of security: the first, manifested by recent scholarly shifts of attention from the abstraction of the state to the corporeal dimension of the human; the second is a growing sense of the impossibility to sustain discursive claims to universality in the light of realist assertions that security must be purchased at the expense of the insecurity and suffering of ‘an-Other’ (2007: 27-32). Concealed under luminous formulations of sovereignty, safety and freedom, security operates on the underside as a subterranean political economy of pain, suffering and death for some in order to become a condition of possibility for the existence, wellbeing and prosperity of others.

Burke calls into question this very ontology of security as a defining condition of human existence and container of being, premised on the conceptualization of safety through Otherness and the invisible and rarely examined nexus between violence and being, security and insecurity. One of the main objectives of Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence is to challenge the form and process of our thought about security, politics, and ethics, an integral element of which is to avoid critical inquiry into this very form. Burke insists on the need to resist ‘the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable ... they condition politics as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present’ (2007: 68).

Drawing on Foucault’s work on power/knowledge, subjectivity, and governmentality, Burke uses empirical cases ranging across
Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia and Australia to re theorize security as a form of power and political technology rather than as the principal container of politics. Security is redefined as a ‘political technology that mobilizes two linked techniques of social production and regulation: totalizing power, of the kind exercised by states over vast areas, economies and populations; and individualizing power, which works at the level of individuals and souls, on their bodies and minds’ (2007: 5-6). In this new context, the question becomes how to refuse security as a technology of subjectivity that structures available possibilities for being and ‘to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society and the international that security seeks to imagine and police’ (2007: 53). A new critical approach is needed to ‘refuse our limits and imagine an unthought beyond them’ and to think our way out of the discourse of absolute security towards a new mode of shared security (2007: 22, 63). Burke suggests that one such move can be pursued through a critical engagement with political theory and continental philosophy: ‘Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs’ (2007: 68-9).

At least three instances of this critical engagement need to be noted. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Burke explores various ways to think their respective histories and incom meracable narratives together. He takes as a starting point Edward Said’s call for the mutual recognition of ‘the universality and integrity of the Other’s experience’ in order to ‘begin to plan a common life together’ (Said, 2000: 208). As a potential ethical source Burke identifies the philosophical thought of Buber and Levinas, both of whom maintain strong notions of the relational nature of human existence, argue that the only mode of being is in the plural ‘with Others,’ and insist on a sympathetic and existential turn to the Other. According to Burke, ‘In their visions of identity and existence the Other is neither a threat, nor an alienated ground for identity, nor a moral object we can choose to assist. Rather the Other is the very purpose and condition of existence’ (2007: 82). This vision of interconnected identity, based upon a primary responsibility to the Other is further developed in Burke’s discussion of the 1990s tensions between the ‘strange neighbors’ Australia and Indonesia. He reads their complex historical interaction against Julia Kristeva’s invitation to welcome and embrace the strangeness within us in order to theorize a transnational ethic of generosity. This ethic recognizes differences that cut through identities and ‘shape relations within and between identities that themselves are neither bounded nor whole’ (2007: 105-7). Finally, in the context of the Iraq war, Burke takes on the instrumental forms of strategy, diplomacy and technological enframing that underpin security as a Cartesian system of ontological certainty and truth. He turns to Heidegger to propose new definitions of humanity’s relation to
Burke’s lucid, well-structured and compelling argument would be of interest to a wide range of readership, spanning international relations, political theory, philosophy, critical social theory and cultural studies. In particular, his timely analysis and command of continental philosophy stand out. In this regard, it is important to reiterate that Burke does not seek to cast off the concept of security; instead, he denaturalizes it and extends its scope beyond the interdependent web of violence, coercion, and insecurity towards a new mode of being. He ties security to the Other through the grammar of Levinasian responsibility.

As with any critical endeavor of such scope and density there are certain areas and pointers for further reflection. For instance, during Burke’s examination of Buber and Levinas he points to their failure to account for the mediated nature of the self-other relation. Burke attempts to resolve this problem of ‘the Third,’ of the Other of the Other, by addressing the social and discursive constitution of the intersubjective system of meaning, within which this relation takes place. Nonetheless, such a solution seems to furnish only a relatively thin notion of the Third unless it is supplemented by what Diana Coole (2001) calls the ‘ontology of the interworld.’ An ontology of the interworld rethinks the plurality of subjects and the sphere of the political in terms of intersubjectivity by drawing attention to the complex interplay of interiority and exteriority in collective life and the multiple struggles for coexistence in ‘the thick, adverse space between subjects’ (Coole 2001: 25-6). This notion of politics as an overdetermined field of forces may enrich Burke’s understanding of the various types of terrain within which international relations must be reinscribed and renegotiated beyond the discourse of security. Since, within such a field of forces permeated with power, each political act is defined by processes of self-invention, the latter ontology may also help him to relate ethics to politics by eliciting an immanent ethics of openness to novel coexistential solutions and possibilities of critical political interventions. What is of concern here is that in Burke’s book it does not become entirely clear what the relationship between ethics and politics is. Does politics precede ethics? Does Burke have a theory of politics at all? In this respect, Beyond Security may be better perceived as the first theoretical stride in a project to rethink the relationship between security, ethics and Otherness. Finally, there exists a plurality of valences of identity, one of which is Burke’s congealed self with the Other, drawn from a Levinasian ethic of responsibility. Yet, another possibility is a proto-notion, an incipient identity in formation at an early stage of becoming, not fully transparent to itself and others. In this respect, the presence and the active constitution of an international space of critical responsiveness (Connolly, 1995) to engage such emerging formations is key to a critical study of international relations. This becomes evident in terms of the study of the birth of revolutionary and social movements,
transborder flows of refugees and bodies, and, perhaps, of the need to reconceptualize the relation between becoming and security.

One way, in which this relation between identity formation, becoming, responsibility and security may be further explored, is through a possible alignment between the psychoanalytical insights of Judith Butler and William Connolly’s engagements with complexity theory. From the point of view of psychoanalysis, Butler argues for the impossibility of giving a full and complete account of oneself since subject formation implies one’s own opacity, vulnerability and primordial dependency on the Other (Butler, 2005). Incoherence structures the way in which we are constituted in relationality and the default patterns of this relationality emerge as the opacity within one’s account of oneself (Butler, 2005: 63-4). We are not only opaque to ourselves but to each other and becoming aware of one dimension of this opacity may often foreclose another. Our own foreignness to ourselves emerges as a source of our ethical connections to others; the acceptance of the limits of knowability of oneself and the other becomes central to the formulation of a certain kind of ethics that reinforces rather than breaks away with this relationality. Butler warns us that demands for coherence, seeking to reinstall the mastery and unity of the subject, according to narrow notions of responsibility as accountability, often force oneself into an artificial and violent existence. This form of ‘ethical violence’ not only consists in the threat to one’s own (or the other’s) intelligibility but can be also observed in judgments in the name of ethics and morality that distance the judging subject from the one being judged (Butler, 2005: 45; 63-4).

Connolly concurs in advance with Butler that responsibility is a ‘systematically ambiguous practice’ and ‘standards of responsibility are both indispensable to social practice and productive of injustices within it’ (Connolly, 1991: 96). Both make the case for a suspension of the urge to judge and the importance of developing a new understanding of responsibility as responsiveness and openness towards others who exceed the bounds of one’s own understanding. Yet, for Connolly this suspension of judgment and coming to terms with our own limits and opacity can also enable us to appreciate the unpredictable novelty, emergence and abundance of life in a world of becoming. Rather than recognized apodictically, now responsibility is best conceived as a second order formation, forged out of care for the world and the fugitive abundance of being that infuses it (Connolly, 1991: xx).

Thus a Butler-Connolly augmentation of Burke may be pertinent to his discussion of the barriers to responsibility, especially in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. On the one hand, Butler’s emphasis on opacity may buttress his critique of the limitations of a Levinasian ethics of responsibility in such cases and the temptation to slide into modes of citizenship-based ethical violence. On the other hand, Connolly’s attentiveness to novelty and becoming may enrich his engagement with Kristeva’s notion of the constitutive strangeness,
differences and conflicts that already cut through identities by opening up spaces of responsiveness to emerging constituencies that require new modes of recognition. The task, shared by Burke with all these thinkers, is to fold a larger degree of forbearance, gratitude for the abundance of being and presumptive generosity into our negotiating stances. It now becomes an indispensible element in transformation of global structures and technologies of power. All these themes and possibilities are already simmering in Burke’s book. The point, perhaps, is to open a mutually illuminating conversation across which to bring them to a higher boil.

In her book *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations* Louiza Odysseos builds on these themes of the political application of the ethical return to the Other, the problem of the Third, and the issues of incipience, contingency, heteronomy and critical responsiveness. Like Burke, she questions the conceptual structures and ontological premises of international relations theory, this time in terms of their stabilization through the centrality of modern subjectivity. Odysseos argues that coexistence has been taken for granted and undertheorized as ‘postontological’ for international relations, in the sense that it has to be derived from some prior purposive action or other sets of ontological assumptions (2007: xxiv). On the grounds of modern subjectivity, coexistence has been conceptualized and articulated through a ‘logic of composition,’ which reduces it to a collection and copresence of already constituted or preformed subjects (2007: xxvi, xxxii). This logic of composition ‘suggests that units or entities are nonrelational in their constitution until “composed,”’ it grasps collectivity through the conceptual lens of the modern observable and unitary subject:

> It not only assumes that collectivities are made up of multiple individual subjects but also that as collectivities they behave as subjects, which works by a reduction of the “we” to an “I” … just as individuals within the state are thought to coexist on the basis of preformed subjectivities, so too does much of international relations theory assume the state to embody a unitary, nonrelational subjectivity. (2007: xxvii)

What follows from such assumptions of nonrelational preconstitution is not that one does not enter into relations with others but that these relations do not flow into selfhood itself. The logic of composition structures coexistence as an afterthought; it tends to presuppose the Schmittian mode of conflict it seeks to rise above. In this way it effaces the constitutive role of otherness in the formation of the subject, which Odysseos terms ‘heteronomy’ (2007: xxviii-xxix). This effacement ‘makes it impossible to recognize that the self … is always already thrown into a world of otherness’ and obscures ‘the self’s otherness, how it is other to itself … when it is grasped as a subject’ (2007: xxix, xxxii).

This conjunction between the logic of composition and the effacement of heteronomy is illustrated in the Hobbesian account of the
anarchical state of nature, which constructs the self/other relation as self/enemy, enmity as omnipresent and survival as the predominant mode of relationality of the subject. ‘The relation to the other becomes a relation of danger’ and enmity that can be overcome only through self-preservation and mastery over self and the other-as-enemy, framed as the Leviathan’s outside (2007: 21, 23). Otherness is reduced to ‘the same(self) since the other is determined as, and represented to, the subject according to the attributes of the very same Hobbesian selfhood’ and ‘knowable nature’ (2007: 21). What is of immediate concern for Odysseos is that this imaginary and pessimistic ontology of danger has informed dominant perspectives of international relations, which have established the realm of the international as presocially dangerous space, inhabited by nonrelational, belligerent subjects, lacking capacity to live with others without a rigid regulatory framework of rules (2007: 22-4). Thus in the heterology of the Leviathan only the civil commonwealth and the social contract can be constitutive of coexistence and polity.

Odysseos turns to the thought and method of Martin Heidegger to retrieve an existential analysis that ‘unworks’ this Hobbesian configuration of subjectivity. Her search for a methodology in Chapter 2 leads her to an experimental mode of phenomenology, characterized as a ‘hermeneutics of facticity,’ whereby the latter term denotes ‘how selves are manifested in their location in the world with others’ (2007: 26). Its purpose is to ‘access the phenomena of existence by examining the being that philosophy had long captured under the heading of the subject’ (2007: 26, 179). In Chapter 3 under the heading ‘optics of coexistence’ she examines four interrelated elements of Heidegger’s philosophy, which in the light of Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s totalizing tendencies, demonstrate the ontological primacy of sociality, Otherness and coexistence for the formation of the self (‘Dasein’: ‘Being there’) as Being-in-the-world. First, Odysseos reads the primary mode of Dasein as ‘engaged immersion’ in its dealings with the world and argues that such an understanding challenges the ‘assumption that reflection and knowing are the definitive modes of human relationality toward entities and the world’ (2007: 90). Second, thinking of being as engaged immersion points to a notion of the world as a web of interinvolvements with others and totality of meanings, assignments and relations that are not created but shared by Dasein. This dependence means that the access Dasein has to itself is mediated through otherness (2007: 59, 90). Third, ‘Dasein is Being–in-the-world with others’ and ‘for Dasein, existence is already coexistence, Being-there is always Being-with. Selfhood is coexistential but this is far from identical to composition or copresence assumed of the completed and autonomous subject of modernity’ (2007: 59, 90-91). Finally, Dasein’s attunement to the world and radical embeddedness in it can be best understood through the ‘structure of thrown projection’ – as it is being thrown into the world it projects itself onto future possibilities. Given this structure, Dasein’s existence is best conceived as care (2007: 91, 180-81).
Odysseos’s creative reading of Heidegger makes possible the disclosure of the self as a heteronomous, coexistential being and a subject of coexistence. In accordance with this view, an inclusive ethics exceeds the simple idea of the universal as it opens to alterity. A ‘recovery of ethical selfhood’ involves relational arts of the self and a cultivation of presumptive openness towards the Other. One such disposition of ‘liberating solicitude’ is articulated by Odysseos with reference to recent theorizing of more inclusive approaches to community, advocated by thinkers such as Linklater and Habermas. She pursues a sensibility of liberating solicitude towards the other as a different path to ‘think coexistence as the sensibility of a heteronomous being’ when it is understood not only as an expression of empathy and authentic care but also as a call for the other to face one’s own contingency, heteronomy, groundedness and ‘anxious Being-in-the-world and ... assume his fundamental mortal possibility’ (2007: 151).

However, liberating solicitude is only one ethical dimension of the self, amenable to noninstrumental relations, whose heightened sense of awareness of contingency and non-self-sufficiency may need to be paralleled by some more positive ethic of affirmation of the abundance of being or attachment to life. While Odysseos herself recognizes this need, she takes a different direction and explores the possibility to develop a critical relation of questioning towards the community itself. Hence, she articulates the concept of ‘critical belonging:

... the “ethical” self’s openness to alterity is brought into the political by destroying ... inappropriate past possibilities and by retrieving those possibilities that ... might have been marginalized and silenced by dominant collective understandings at specific historical moments. This deconstruction liberates groups and others that were silenced by the tradition, making their voices heard. (2007: 184)

As critical belonging rearticulates and disturbs the repeatable possibilities of the particular historical tradition and brings difference and outsiders to act upon them, it becomes central for international relations theory in the age of globalization. It theorizes the agonistic encounters and negotiations of multiple emerging perspectives and minorities as we become more and more entangled with one another. It ‘enables a movement from the community’s conceptualization as uniform and essentialist to its diversification, both from inside and from an outside that is already within’ (2007: 175-6).

In spite of the overriding historicity of Odysseos’s notion of critical belonging, it serves as the pivotal juncture of politics and new ethics of incipience, undertheorized by Burke in Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence. In turn, Burke’s outstanding and insightful take on a wide array of philosophical approaches may diversify Odysseos’s Heideggerian frame at the same time as her ethical explorations fill in the political vacuum of his otherwise impressive study. However, within these newly opened spaces for coexistence and shared
security in the international realm, both Burke and Odysseos seem to shift language from state to self effortlessly. These shifts would be sufficient if the focus of their investigations had been limited to cross-state citizen movements or transnational advocacy networks. But each has a larger agenda, to forestall strategies by realists to overwhelm the social dynamics of citizen life with the iron clad dictates of the state in an anarchical order. In this sense, it would be best to read the two books together while keeping Schmitt’s *The Concept of the Political* in sight as a prod to both. After all, Schmitt helps to activate the divisive passions he warns are always on the horizon, and states out loud what both Burke and Odysseos promise to rethink. Yet, as Burke and Odysseos explore dispositions, connections, and modes of engagement that reopen the doors Schmitt and other realists close, danger persists. There is the possibility that new dramatic events may occur, threatening personal and political landscapes and generating new tensions. There is the risk that, while some states and non-state actors accept the invitation to open these doors, others will not. The point is that the reorientations and practices Burke and Odysseos promote increase the possibility of productive relations and negotiations in global politics while the Schmittian imperative feeds the very dangers it identifies.

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**Bibliography**


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