Global Israel:
Settler Colonialism, Mobility, and Rupture

Magid Shihade
Institute of International Studies, Birzeit University

This article engages two presumably unrelated schools of thought: first, theories of nomadology and mobility by Deleuze & Guattari (1986) and their earlier, more expansive incarnation as theorized by the 14th century Arab scholar, Ibn Khaldoun; and second, theories of settler colonialism, especially as articulated by Fayez Sayegh (1965) that focused on Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine as a rupture of Asia and Africa. By expanding the concept of rupture, I argue that settler colonialism in Palestine can be better understood in its global dimension and impact, rather than as it is normally analyzed as a purely local or even regional issue. This article thus contributes to work on settler colonialism, nomadology, Palestine and Arab Studies, and Global Studies, and it aims at de-provincializing the question of Palestine and Palestine studies. It theorizes a new way of seeing Palestine by reframing the Palestine question as a local, regional, continental, and a global issue both in its origin and its current development, by examining how Israel has created local, regional, and global ruptures for Palestinians and others.

Introduction

This article is part of my current research project on settler colonialism in Palestine. It builds on two previous articles. The first article (Shihade 2015a) focused on the local impact of Israeli settler colonialism. Through stories and voices of residents in Kafr Yassif, a Palestinian village in Galilee, it explores the impact of 1948, the creation of the Israeli settler colonial state, and the imposition of military rule soon after, on the sense of place, confinement, isolation, and alienation that these Palestinians felt since 1948, the rupturing of their connections to the rest of the Palestinian society, and their connections to peoples and places in the neighboring Arab states and
beyond. It is an article about those Palestinians who remained on their lands after 1948 and became citizens of a state that was built on the destruction of their own society, and how the restrictions on mobility within and without Palestine affected their sense of space, and identity. It also explored different forms of connections they tried to create as a response to the new situation they found themselves in, their history of resistance to state policies filled with aspirations, hope, desires, and complicity. The article explored their histories and voices that challenge both Arab nationalist historiography that, in reaction to Zionism, claimed rootedness and indigeneity, and at the same time it challenges Zionists myths about the un-rootedness of Palestinian Arabs representing them as un-rooted/nomads invaders/strangers to the land, and held them in contempt and saw them as a fifth column. Their stories and voices challenge the sense of presence and absence that they find themselves in both by Zionism and the Israeli State, but also by Arab nationalism that mirrored Zionism and western modernity by focusing on the land/state and ignored the human (Maira & Shihade 2012).

The second article (Shihade 2015b) focuses on the regional/continental impact, and questions the place of Israel in Asia, a state that considers itself European/Western, as portrayed by its own leadership, and it is also viewed as such by Western leaders and publics, a point often publically stated by Zionist and western leaders. By asking about the place of Israel in Asia, my approach in that article thus positions this cartographical question in the context of race, colonialism/settler colonialism, and modernity. The article also raises the question about the place of native Palestinians in Asia. That is, what are the political, economic, social, and cultural consequences and connections possible if one thinks of Palestinians as West Asians, or as Asians, rather than as ‘Middle Easterners’. As such, the article is also about rethinking Asia and the meaning of Asia, how the geographic and political construct of Asia was developed, and who is included in this designation. It explores the cross-regional and trans-border connections within Asia that have been marginalized in academic work but also in public memory and knowledge about the peoples of the region and their long history of interaction; the cultural flows within the continent; and economic, and political connections among peoples, groups, and states within the continent of Asia.

Building on the two articles summarized above, this article links the local, regional/continental with the global by looking at the place of Israel in the globe, or what I call here ‘global Israel’. Thinking about Israel in this way extends the question of the cartography of Palestine/West Asia and Israel-in-Asia to thinking about Israel in the world and to Israelization as a global process that has ramifications for those outside the region and continent.

I also want to make a brief note about my research method here, for I do not define my interviewees as those to be studied or objects of knowledge production, or as ‘anthropos’ in the words of Walter
Mignolo (2000), but as a source of knowledge and epistemology. It is from the conversations with these Palestinian villagers and workers that I was struck by the idea of a Global Israel, and not just a local or an Asian/regional Israel. I realize that this concept was a more fitting one that would engage with the impact of the Israeli settler colonial state on Palestine. I will gesture here to a few preliminary points that undergird the global nature of this settler colonial project. One, the Israeli settler colonial state triggered the dispersal of millions of Palestinians to Asia, Africa, Europe, Australia, and the Americas and thus made them part of a global diaspora and exilic subjects who by nature have a deep attachment to their homeland and the people from whom they were separated. Two, the Zionist project also claims to represent Jews around the globe, and indeed has recruited Jewish communities from all around the globe to manage this project. Furthermore, Jewish communities around the world continue to engage with the Israeli project either by critiquing it, or more commonly by supporting it and agitating against those who critique Israel. Finally, due to the significance of religious sites and histories, Palestine/Israel elicits strong feelings, attachments, and interventions from people around the globe. Thus, it is very fitting to think of Israel/Palestine as a global question and of what I am calling ‘global Israel’.

The major focus of this article is an argument for why the Israeli settler colonial project in Palestine is better theorized as a global question and not just one that impacts the native Palestinian and local space or a regional question. This argument does not negate the local and regional impact of Israel, nor does it deny that the most staggering consequences of the creation of Israel were felt most by the native Palestinian society, but rather it conceptualizes the ‘local’ through its regional and global dimensions.

Hence, the article is divided into three parts. First, I will analyze the local impact through questions of connections and mobility that existed before 1948 that were ruptured as a result of the creation of the Israeli settler colonial state. Second, I will offer an analysis of the regional implication considering how that structure/the settler colonial state had very important ramifications for people and states beyond the Palestinians and Palestine. In the third part, I will discuss the global impact of settler colonialism in Palestine. Before discussing these three layers, I will discuss the theoretical framework, which occupies a significant part of this article. And the three parts that follow the theoretical framework do not offer a detailed study, but should be taken primarily as a brief engagement with the argument that I offer in this article, each with a few points to illustrate the argument/analysis.

**Theoretical Framework**

This article utilizes and engages with two supposedly unrelated schools of thought; theories of settler colonialism especially the work
of Fayez Sayegh (1965) that theorizes Zionist settler colonialism in Palestine as a rupture to Asia and Africa, and the school of nomadology/mobility as theorized by Deleuze & Guattari (1986) and its earlier and more expansive version as theorized by the 14th century Arab scholar—Ibn Khaldoun.

In theories of Settler Colonialism and Palestine Studies, Sayegh’s work (1965) is a pioneering one for it goes beyond the local implication of Israeli settler colonialism. Sayegh argues that the creation of the Israeli state led to the delinking of Palestine from Asia and Africa, as Palestine historically formed a link between these two continents (Sayegh 1965, pp. v, 16, 17, 51). Furthermore, the settler colonial project undermines the sovereignty and self-determination not just of Palestinians but also of all the peoples in these continents because it did not receive their consent (Sayegh 1965, pp. 17, 51). According to Sayegh, the creation of the Israeli settler colonial state was an imposition on the region by western colonial powers against the wishes of the peoples of Africa and Asia, which created a rupture between Africa and Asia that countered and undermined the decolonizing wave in these continents (Sayegh 1965, pp. 16-17, 50, 51). My study builds on this argument by looking at the implications of Israel as a rupture beyond Asia and Africa. To begin with, Palestine is not only connected to these continents, but also to the Mediterranean and was always a link that connected peoples from countries around it, and many from Greece and other places migrated to Palestine. As I show in my article in Biography (Shihade 2015a), some of these migrants became leading figures in the Palestine national movement. So, to limit the impact of rupture of Israeli settler colonialism to only Africa and Asia limits our understanding of its implications globally.

Furthermore, the Israeli settler colonial project has been a global one from its founding and was supported, and continues to be aided and defended, by global empires. It was a project that defined itself as a global one; the ‘ingathering’ of Jews from all over the world, and continues to be claimed as a project that all Jews around the world must support. Furthermore, by the creation of Israel, millions of Palestinians today live all over the world and have an attachment to Palestine that remains restricted and shaped by Israeli policies of denial to return, restriction on entry, and restriction on family unification.

Also, Israel/Palestine is a question that occupies so much attention at the United Nations, in world politics, and in so many states often exhausting energies and resources. It is a question that generates much solidarity all around the world for those who see the injustice done to the native Palestinians, a solidarity that is also met with attacks and repressions in many parts of the world by pro-Israeli forces. In Global Palestine, John Collins (2011) argues that the Palestine question has created such a powerful global solidarity movement because of the many issues intertwined with it that affect people all around the world, such as access to water, access to land,
the right to mobility, the right to education, the right to work, the right to self-determination, the right to freedom of speech, and indeed, the right to life—a life with dignity. *Global Israel*, I argue, is the other side of the coin of Collin’s analysis of *Global Palestine* as a signifier of global solidarity. *Global Israel* has infringed on all these rights locally, regionally, and globally, albeit with different intensity and outcomes.

Thus, in my view, it is through the study of this global rupture created by the Israeli settler colonial state from 1948 to the present that one can better understand its global impact, which includes wars, displacement, refugees, invasions, air strikes, blockades, sanctions, repression, and restrictions on movement, restriction on entry, among other consequences. That rupture has become a permanent structure that has been impacting peoples from both continents and beyond, and it has also produced a global movement of solidarity.

To theorize the rupture produced by global Israel I utilize the work of the 14th century Arab scholar, Ibn Khaldoun, especially his concept of the nomad as a lens to understand mobility as a central aspect of human life. My work brings the theories of Sayegh and Ibn Khaldoun into conversation, as they both deal with rupture, but from different intellectual perspectives. Sayegh uses a Third Worldist prism and analysis of settler colonialism, while Ibn Khaldoun was thinking about questions of the nature of the human, and the ways in which mobility, connections and cooperation, and labor and creativity are all central to being human in his analysis. I utilize Ibn Khaldoun’s work on nomadology/mobility as a corrective to its misappropriation by Deleuze & Guattari (1986).

Deleuze & Guattari (1986) borrow the concept of the nomad from Ibn Khaldoun, with a marginal reference in their work (pp. 26, 27, notes p. 128), but their work restricts the meaning of the nomad to one aspect, central as it is, that focuses on the relationship between the individual and the state, specifically in the context of violence and war-making (pp. 14, 17). Accordingly, their analysis is confined to the modern European state, in line with the work of Charles Tilly (1985), among others, that also views the individual through the prism of the modern state, a specifically Eurocentric approach. On the other end of the spectrum of the school of nomadology that developed from the work of Deleuze & Guattari, the nomad is presented as the human who is without roots, without connections, and continually roaming the earth unmoored from political structures or places of origin (Deleuze & Guattari 1986, pp. 15-17). This romanticized version of the nomad has been criticized, and rightly so. Alex Young (2015 Forthcoming), building on the work of critical Native American scholarship such as that of Jodi Byrd, argues that this idealized notion of the nomad in the Deleuzean School serves to erase both the Natives, who are excluded from such narratives, and their history and experience as a result of violent Western/European mobility/nomadology. Young terms this view of nomadology as based on a settler colonial fantasy. Thus, my theorizing of nomadology/mobility, as articulated originally by Ibn
Khaldoun and later misappropriated by Deleuze & Guattari, can contribute to the ongoing debate about settler colonialism in different fields, and to the discussion of border studies and migration, among other issues.

Deleuze & Guattari’s framing and exceptionalizing the nomad, either as a violent conqueror or as world traveler, is in both senses a misconception of the original concept offered by Ibn Khaldoun. The nomad is part of Ibn Khaldoun’s theorizing of social organizations that took place in the context of pre-modern nation states. While mobile humans or nomads, in Ibn Khaldoun’s understanding, often do challenge the rule or government of territory during and through their mobility and can engage in violent resistance to that rule, there are other aspects of mobility that are central to being human. In contrast to the restricted analysis of nomadology and mobility, which emerges also from a western privilege of movement, rootedness and mobility are dialectically related for Ibn Khaldoun. Nomadism is neither about invading Mongols nor the romance of Orientalized Bedouin sheiks. Ibn Khaldoun’s Arabic term for the nomad, badawi/badiw (Bedouin/Bedouins), is primarily an economic category rather than an essentialized cultural trait. It references a mode of economic production or as he described it, the way one or a group makes a living. The Nomad’s way of making a living is through raising animals and farming. Both forms of work require rootedness as well as mobility (Ibn Khaldoun 2005, pp. 309-317, 320-321). In the time of Ibn Khaldoun, which was a different historical context, rootedness was not viewed as in opposition to or a negation of mobility/nomadology, but rather each was connected with and constituted the other. Mobility is something that people do, not simply because of a lack of rootedness or a desire to roam the earth, but out of necessity (Ibn Khaldoun 2005, pp. 265, 270, 278, 285-287, 290). So the fact that the original concept is not acknowledged, but incompletely appropriated, leads to further misrepresentation of the nomad. And it is a concept that has been used in Western/European settler colonial adventure to argue against the Native/Indigenous claims to territory. If Natives/Indigenous are portrayed as nomads and not belonging to a specific place, then they have no right in resisting the settler colonial project, so goes the argument, which has been used by Zionist and Israeli ideologues as well.

Yet, for Ibn Khaldoun, nomadology is the norm, not the exception—it is not a trait that belongs to the few. Nomadism is not associated with violent movement, and violence is not central to nomadism. Nomadism for Ibn Khaldoun is more about labor and sustenance, concerns that are central to any human or social organization (Ibn Khaldoun 2005, p. 298). He argues that all people, by nature, seek sustenance and so must move, to different degrees and in different ways, from one place to another in order to labor and survive. They move when there is a lack of resources in the areas they live in, or when their labor is not treated justly. They move because of their desire to explore, experience, and connect. The Nomad, for Ibn Khaldoun, is central to any human social organization (2005, pp. 265,
The important point here is that nomadology/nomadism is not strictly tied to conquest or violence, as Deleuze & Guattari theorize it. Nomadology/nomadism is about seeking refuge as well, as well as about creativity, and at its core is the ontology of a free person/human. After all, we are told again and again by western thought, that it is only ‘natural’ to be free as a human. Yet freedom and mobility have, since the rise and dominance of western modernity represented the privilege of some. In the case of Palestine, it is the settler who has the privilege of freedom of mobility, taking over the natural habitat of the native, while disrupting not only the natives’ lives, but also rupturing the flow of movement and interconnectedness in the region and beyond. So what has disrupted this condition of being human—nomadology—is precisely western modernity, racism, nation-states, colonialism, and, acutely so, settler colonialism. One can conclude that it is the settler that has been the practitioner of violence, not the nomad.

It would have been more useful, and original, if Deleuze & Guattari had engaged the work of Ibn Khaldoun by taking into account this larger understanding of his concept of nomadology, and engaged with its application to the modern state, especially the settler colonial state, given his concept on the human nature of mobility, which for the modern state is an anomaly. In other words, if we follow Ibn Khaldoun’s theorization of human nature, the modern nation-state form goes against the grain of the human in restricting a constitutive element of human nature, that is, mobility. The settler colonial state, in particular, has its own specific dynamic of rupture, which, in accordance with Ibn Khaldoun’s work, highlights the value of the insights offered by Sayegh into Zionist colonization of Palestine. In the case of Palestine, the establishment of the Israeli settler colonial state led to a shattering of the Palestinian community and its social organization as they existed prior to 1948, for it dismembered and detached pre-1948 Palestinian society from its Arab surroundings and beyond. Furthermore, through its wars against Arab states, Israel disarticulated the entire region that had for thousands of years been an important meeting point and a key node in the circulation of goods, humans, labor, and ideas extending from Asia and Africa to the Mediterranean and beyond.

As a way to illustrate my argument in this article, in the following sections, I will briefly clarify what I mean by mobility, connections, and rupture in discussing the local, regional, and global impact of Israeli settler colonialism. Although the impact of global Israel is divided into three distinct categories, these categories are linked and interwoven as I will demonstrate.
Local Ruptures: Displacements and Disconnections

A key point to note about local ruptures created by Israel is that the displacement of Palestinians started earlier than 1948, especially among farmers who used to live on lands they farmed and who became not only jobless, but also homeless, as a result of the waves of encroaching Zionist settlements in Palestine during the British colonial rule that began immediately after World War I. This displacement happened in the context of the sale of lands to Jewish settlers by absentee Palestinian landowners, but more so due to policies of the British colonial government that took over common lands that existed during the Ottoman period and gave them to Jewish settlers. These common lands, or masha’ in Arabic, were historically used by farmers who cultivated and lived on them, paying taxes to the Ottoman government.

Yet, the major event that led to mass displacement took place in 1948 when Zionist military groups who were fighting to establish the Israeli state drove out about 85% of the Palestinian population from their lands, homes, villages, towns and cities. These Palestinians became refugees in areas outside of the control of the newly created Israeli state; in Gaza, the West Bank, neighboring villages and towns within the state itself, and especially in neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. This one-way exodus and forced mobility was, and remains in contrast to the multiple modes of mobility utilized by the Israeli colonial settler regime and its privileged Jewish settlers. Israel allows and grants automatic entry to Jews from anywhere in the world and continues to prevent the return and entry of displaced and exiled natives. This Israeli Law of Return that privileges Jews is in contrast to the transfer of local native Palestinians, the denial of the right of return to Palestinian refugees, the restrictions on entry to Palestinians, and the restrictions on family unification. While it is important to consider the question of class and gender in the way this displacement affected Palestinian society, the Zionist regime targeted the Palestinian population as a whole without any consideration of religious, social, and economic distinctions within the targeted communities. Old, young, male, female, Muslim, Christian, rich, and poor Palestinians faced the same fate. Yet, of course, each of these social and economic categories had an impact on the way displaced Palestinians fared after 1948.

This system or structure of displacement, and restriction on mobility continued to take place and never stopped after 1948. Even after the War of 1948 ended, the Israeli military continued to push Palestinians out of their lands beyond the borders to neighboring states, or within the borders of the state itself. Sometimes whole villages were emptied of their residents who sought refuge in nearby villages and towns as happened in Iqrit and Kafr Bir'im in Galilee. People in these two Palestinian villages were asked to leave by the Israeli military under the pretext of ‘caring for their safety’, for the Israeli military claimed that it was fighting ‘infiltrators’ from the Lebanese borders, and hence
needed to evict those who lived in these two villages in order to clear the ground to fight those ‘infiltrating’ across the border. Even after this ‘infiltration’ ended, residents of these two villages have not been allowed to this date to return to their homes, and continue to live as refugees in neighboring villages and towns. Land confiscation and displacement targeting native Palestinians continues to take place from the north to the south of the country. At the same time, more land is given to Jewish settlements, and more Jews from around the world are brought in to take over land and resources. Of course they have not been all treated equally, and the racism and discrimination against non-western Jews is documents in many studies.

Furthermore, several layers and forms of disconnection have taken place since 1948. Individuals from the neighboring region who came to work in Palestinian cities like Haifa before the establishment of the rigid borders of the settler state, and who intermarried with locals found themselves trapped. They could no longer travel back and forth across the region as they did before 1948 and they lost all connections to their families and friends in Lebanon and Syria. Those Palestinians who managed to remain on the land and became Israeli citizens over time became disconnected from Lebanon and Syria, with the severing of relationships through commerce and trade as well as historical cultural ties. Many Palestinian families were dispersed and split as a result of the creation of the Israeli state. Those who were working in Lebanon or travelling in Lebanon and Syria around 1948 were never allowed to return. Some returned only as dead bodies after their families pleaded with the Israeli authorities to let them at least bury their relatives in the same family cemetery. Thus, their reunification with their families was only possible in death.

To this day, the Israeli state continues to issue different laws and regulations preventing its Palestinian citizens from inter-marrying with Palestinian from Gaza, the West Bank, and elsewhere if they wish to remain citizens of the state, living on what remains of their land. The state thus has been active in disconnecting its Palestinian citizens from the rest of Palestinian society on many levels, including in the domains of emotions and desires. To fall in love with another Palestinian from elsewhere is something that must be carefully calculated for Palestinians inside Israel, because marriage could mean that one either has to leave his/her family to live outside of the borders of the Israeli state, or have children who will live in a legal limbo.

The same pattern of fragmentation and disconnection is taking place in Palestinian areas colonized by Israel in 1967 and more acutely so in the last few decades. Those who live in Gaza find it almost impossible to have social relations with people who live in Galilee, Jerusalem, or the West Bank due to the Israeli siege that has encaged them in the narrow strip. The same is true for Palestinians who live in any of these other areas in relation to Gazans. Jerusalem is very close to Ramallah, yet it is incredibly difficult for two people
living in each of these cities to fall in love and want to live together, because if they do, they cannot live in Jerusalem and would have to give up their legal right to live there. It is a huge problem for many Palestinians to just visit one another if they live in different parts of Palestine, for each area or Bantustan has a different legal status imposed on its residents by the Israeli settler colonial state.

These policies of systematic dismembering of Palestinian society, disconnection from the natural environment and neighboring states, forced removal/mobility and displacement, and depopulation, is juxtaposed with the easy mobility afforded to Jewish settlers who can come from any corner of the world to live in Palestine and receive automatic citizenship and rights. They can fall in love and live with whomever they wish, marry freely, travel as they please, and in addition receive state grants, land, and housing. Most have dual citizenship so they can travel to all Arab countries, including to places that native Palestinians used to visit and no longer can enter if they are Israeli citizens. They enlist in the Israeli military and different state security forces that enact different forms of repression and violence against Palestinians and Arabs. I argue that given these realities, the settlers are the true, violent nomads (as per Deleuze's definition), while the condition of the nomad/human, in the true sense of the word (as per Ibn Khaldoun's definition) has been wrested from the native Palestinian. What befell Palestinian society since 1948 also has had an impact on peoples living in neighboring states, as I discuss next.

**Regional Ruptures**

The rupture and fragmentation that devastated Palestinian society has also transformed and ruptured neighboring societies in various ways. First, masses of Palestinian refugees suddenly descended on the adjacent countries, and in some cases either outnumbered the local population, as in Jordan, or arrived in numbers that overwhelmed small states, such as Lebanon, with various social, political and economic ramifications. In both countries, the state entered into wars against the Palestinian refugees, whose political organization, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), attempted to fight the Israeli state in the hope of return to Palestine. Facing reprisals, invasions, and wars by the settler colonial state, the Jordanian state and powerful groups in Lebanon responded with violence against the PLO and the Palestinian refugees on several occasions, trying to survive next door to a powerful bully and aggressive military state supported by world powers and the global economic system.

Furthermore, due to the settler colonial nature of the Israeli state, that by definition is a state with open frontiers, a state which never declared its official borders, the neighboring states have experienced Israeli transgressions in different ways since 1948. In addition to the refugees that flooded these countries, they have faced wars, invasions, bombings, and constant attacks. These waves of Israeli state violence have led to the occupation of neighboring Arab lands,
repression, destruction, and displacement of the populations living near the borders who moved away to avoid the death and destruction leveled against them by the Israeli military. To this day, Lebanese farmers who insisted on remaining on their lands that are near the border with Israel continue to face Israeli aggression, bombings, shelling, even kidnapping. But this was not the only impact, nor have I even talked about Syrians who fell under Israeli occupation in the Golan Heights, nor discussed the impact on Egypt and Egyptian society, but due to limits of space, I have restricted the discussion mainly to Lebanon, and specifically around mobility, rupture and disconnections as a way to illustrate my argument about the regional impact of Israeli settler colonialism.

As mentioned earlier, the historic, economic, social, and cultural ties that connected people from around the region with Palestine were also ruptured as a result of the creation of Israel. The trade and commerce that linked the peoples in the region prior to 1948 was eroded, and the social ties that had existed since before 1948 were undermined. Cultural and religious ties that connected Christians and Muslims in the region with holy sites in Palestine were diminished. But this local and regional impact is not the end of the story, and is in many ways linked to the global rupture.

**Global Ruptures**

Palestine served for centuries as a crossroad between Asia, Africa, the Mediterranean, and beyond. It was an important economic node as it lay on the trade route that merchants used to travel through Palestine to other destinations, bringing products from as far away as today's China and India to South Europe and further and linking regions and continents with social, economic, and cultural flows and influences. That period of transnational migration and trade, with all its flexible mobility, ended in 1948. By waging war with Arab states and societies, Israel destroyed the historic route that linked all these locations and delinked these societies. Even when Israel tried to establish political and economic relations with states in Asia and Africa, as elsewhere, the main trade item it exported was its arms, technologies of surveillance, and expertise in repression. Israel is thus a key player in the global economy of violence and militarization, and repression (International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network (IJAN) 2012).

Palestine was also transformed from being an important cultural site for those who visited due to religious affiliations to a place that became inaccessible to many. While prior to 1948, any one with the means to travel could visit religious sites in Palestine, after 1948 wealth became a non-factor in mobility and connections to the holy sites. The only factor that enabled travel was the nature of the diplomatic relations between the Israeli state and the state to which travelers belonged. Mobility for non-Palestinians wanting to visit Palestine became selective and restrictive for hundreds of millions of peoples around the world. This rupture was experienced not just by
Arabs and Muslims, but also by citizens of states that had no
diplomatic relations with Israel after 1948, or cut their diplomatic
relations in protest of Israeli aggression against Palestinians and
Arabs. Many States who opposed Israeli participation in the 1956
invasion of Egypt severed their diplomatic relations at that time, and
others did so in response to Israel’s war against Arab states in 1967
and the colonization of the remainder of Palestine as well as areas in
neighboring Arab countries. The hopes of some and fantasies of
others, of the possibilities and potential of the Oslo Accords signed by
Israel and the PLO in 1993 ended very soon afterwards due to Israel’s
continuous settlements, expansion and violence. To this day, with
each Israeli invasion and war, more diplomatic ties with Israel are cut,
even by States as far away as Latin America, as during the 2014
invasion of Gaza. For states that re-established relations with Israel
after Oslo, these ties remained based on security and intelligence
cooperation, and are mostly one-way circuits between countries to
which Israeli arms, ‘counterterrorism’ techniques, and surveillance are
exported, that is, technologies of repression and death. Israeli tourists,
many of whom flock annually to retreats in places such as India after
ending their compulsory military service, use these locations in Asia
as a therapeutic escape from their violent experiences as soldiers of a
colonizing military force. They are involved in war after war and in the
constant repression of native Palestinians, as part of a militarized and
racist society. There is much more to be said here about the ways in
which these flows, of arms and tourists, resituate Israel and Israeli
culture in Asia, as a region that is Orientalized by many Israelis as a
mystical and spiritual place, and concurrently, how other societies are
being Israelized, contributing to other kinds of ruptures of ties with
Palestine as global Israel is consolidated in faraway locations.

These economic and cultural ruptures also have layered social
dimensions. Due to the history of trade and cultural/religious tourism,
Palestinian society was enriched by intermarriages with pilgrims and
traders, and was made ethnically and racially diverse as a result of
migration. Older patterns of migration and mobility brought peoples
from all around the world as is reflected in the racial and phenotypic
diversity and names common in Palestine; for example, Hindi for
those whose ancestors hailed from India, Irani from Iran, Armani from
Armenia, Turki from Turkey, Qatalani from Catalonia, Yanni from
Greece, or Afghani from Afghanistan. There are many other examples
of these histories of migrants/mobile subjects who came to live among
the Palestinians and which ended in 1948. The genuine, more
‘human’ nomadology has been replaced since then by the mobility of
settlers and those who claim to be Jews and can enter the lands and
further displace the local, native Palestinians.

While Israeli settlers, many with dual citizenship, roam around the
globe with relative ease, travelers to Israel-Palestine are profiled,
interrogated, and detained at Israeli borders, according to their Arab
or Muslim-sounding names, in addition to their political allegiances
and involvement. Individuals suspected of being in solidarity with the
native Palestinians, are always either harassed and detained at entry
points or denied entry and deported. Even those who are allowed to enter, with limitation on their period of visit, are monitored and questioned before their departure by Israeli intelligence and authorities at the airport about the places they visited and the people they met, as a part of the Israeli strategy to restrict mixing and connecting with the native Palestinian community and so limiting exposure to the realities on the ground in Palestine. Of course, Palestinians who try to travel across Israeli borders are routinely subjected to this kind of treatment, and much worse.

Thus, settler colonialism in Palestine not only occupies major attention around the globe, and the investment of resources from so many states around the world concerned with this issue one way or the other, but it also creates ruptures for those who feel solidarity with the Palestinian cause and the native Palestinians. One example of such rupture is the question of the growing movement for academic boycott of Israeli institutions. For example, in the United States academics can exercise their right to freedom of expression in their intellectual work and can be publicly critical of any society and any state, including the United States itself, without any repercussion in general. However, the slightest criticism of Israel and Israeli society is faced with wholesale attacks, charges of anti-Semitism, and censorship. Academics who display a strong attachment to and solidarity with the Palestinians or express a public critique of the Israeli state can either be blocked from getting an academic job, or lose their employment. At the least, they are often defamed, harassed, and disciplined.

The recent case of Steven Salaita is one such example of censure and penalization for pro-Palestine speech and boycott activism. Salaita, who is a well-known Palestinian American scholar, whose work *Holy Land in Transit* (2006) was an attempt to link a similar dynamic and ideology of settler colonialism both in the United States and in Israel, accepted and signed a job offer as tenured professor from the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign resigning from his position as an associate professor at Virginia Tech. But due to his critical scholarly work and vocal criticism of the Israeli state, especially during the 2014 invasion of Gaza, in his publications and media engagements, including social media, and his advocacy of the academic boycott, he was fired from his job, in effect, and left unemployed. After selling his house in Virginia, he and his wife and their child live temporarily with his parents. Salaita and his family are forced to live in limbo just because of his strong critique of the racist and violent policies of the Israeli state. Similar patterns of rupture of scholars’ lives due to their solidarity with Palestine take place in many other countries in Europe, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere. Salaita’s case is a good one to end this part with, as it articulates not only the working of many Zionist groups in repressing critics, but it also connects the three parts of the impact of settler colonialism in Palestine.
Although there are many examples of academic censure and repression similar to the case of Salaita, his story illustrates the harsh consequences of the rupture created by the creation of the Israeli settler colonial state. His personal story connects the local, the regional, and the global in an interesting way. He was born to a Palestinian family that was displaced by the creation of the Israeli settler colonial state, becoming part of a refugee diaspora who scattered all around the world, to Jordan, the United States, and Latin America and often intermarried with the host/local population. His own connection to Palestine and its people was ruptured; his ability to travel to Palestine was restricted by the Israeli authorities; and his academic work was shaped by his roots in Palestine and his experience as an immigrant in the US, another settler colonial state. Notably, Salaita’s scholarship has always connected these two settler colonies and their indigenous peoples in a critical way. His writing expresses a form of attachment and connection to Palestine and caused him a further rupture of his life in the US. Now, Salaita’s own move to another location to work at another university in the US and his own professional mobility has been disrupted. Salaita, like many others, drew the vengeful wrath of those who blindly support the Israeli state and who do not tolerate bold critique of its policies. But his case also provoked an outpouring of support across the United States among those who felt solidarity and empathy for his fate and his intellectual and political work, sparking a vigorous campaign. Energies and resources are spent by both the Global Israel and Global Palestine campaigns; one wishes to make the rupture in his life and his family life a permanent one, and the other is mobilizing to bring back normalcy to his and his family life, and to highlight the assault on academic freedom.

Conclusion

This article is to be seen as an exploration of an approach that aims at reframing and rethinking the question of Israel/Palestine. It is part of my current work, and so it ought to be taken as a work in progress rather than a detailed study. As I have argued in this article, the Israeli settler colonial case sets itself apart from all other settler colonial cases by its local, regional, and global impact. Mobility, connections, exchanges, and normal life of the nomad/human has been since 1948 in constant trials and upheaval. The dominant form of mobility/nomadology that has taken place since then is the violent and repressive one, that of the settler. Hence, the claims that modernity brought an ease in mobility, and that Israel represents western modernity in the Orient, while pre-modern times are represented as restricting mobility can be seen as false in this light.

As John Collins (2011) argues in Global Palestine, Palestine can serve and has been serving several global questions and concerns and thus global solidarity for millions of people around the globe who are connected with needs that are normal or natural to every human being: the right to education, to health, to life, access to water,
employment, and mobility which is central to all. Global Israel on the other hand is the other side of that coin and it is a structure that ruptures mobility, normalcy, and many basic needs and aspirations of millions of peoples around the world. The more dominant form of mobility since 1948, as a result of the creation of the Israeli settler colonial state, is the mobility of the settler. This kind of mobility is exemplified by violence and repression, arms trade, and technologies of surveillance, and militarization that shape Israeli mobility locally, regionally, and globally, is accompanied by the forced mobility and restrictions on mobility visited on native Palestinians and many others by the Israeli state and upheld by its many supporters around the world.

Magid Shihade is a faculty member at the Institute of International Studies at Birzeit University, Birzeit, Palestine.

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