Homeland Nationalism and Guarding Dignity in a Settler Colonial Context: The Palestinian Citizens of Israel Reclaim Their Homeland

Nadim N. Rouhana
Tufts University and
Mada al-Carmel, Haifa

This paper seeks to examine the foundations of indignities inflicted upon a native population in a settler-colonial condition and to explore how they face these indignities, both in their popular rhetoric and political action. I look at how Palestinian citizens in Israel articulate their homeland nationalism in the face of a unique Zionist view denying the Palestinians’ relationship to their homeland and claiming it exclusively for the Jewish people, who have come to identify themselves as the true natives. The indignities accompanying such claims are so profoundly and naturally entrenched in Israel’s settler-colonial structure that the state’s hegemonic political culture takes their intense and repeated occurrence for granted.

My point of departure theorizes Zionism and the state of Israel through a settler-colonial frame, but not as a ‘triumphed’ settler project. Mamdani (2015) observes that settler-colonial studies place settler cases in Africa and America in two opposite poles: In Africa, settler colonialism has been defeated; in America, it is perceived to have triumphed. I argue that the Israeli case, on which this paper focuses, is an ongoing project whose outcome is still undetermined. Thus, it falls in neither pole; it has neither been defeated nor should it be considered to have ‘triumphed’. It is incontestable that Zionism has achieved impressive successes as it has built a state with a dynamic society, strong economy, and powerful military, and it has revived an ancient language and gained international legitimacy. Zionism has also achieved, as a fact on the ground, its main goal: establishing an ethnically exclusive Jewish state. Yet, I argue that Israel should not be placed in the category of triumphed settlers’ projects because its main goal is still actively challenged and resisted by a nation that Zionism
has defeated but failed to reduce to the status of indigenous populations in ‘triumphed’ settler-colonial cases. The Palestinians have not granted the Jewish state legitimacy and continue to claim their homeland in different ways: Palestinian citizens deny recognizing Israel as an ethnic Jewish state, claim that the homeland on which the Jewish state is established is rightfully theirs (not exclusively), and seek to transform Israel into a democratic state; Palestinian refugees whose right of return is supported by International law seek to be repatriated to their homeland; and Palestinians under military occupation reject recognizing Israel as a Jewish state even in a two-state solution framework. The argument that the ultimate outcome of the Zionist project remains undetermined is, therefore, closely related to the modern political homeland nationalism of the Palestinian people and among the Palestinian citizens of Israel, who are the subject of this paper. The focus here is not the structure of Israel’s settler state or the assemblage of historical and current practices that make it such. Some of that work has been done, though more attention should be paid to the entanglement of the Zionist movement’s ideology and the Israeli state’s religious and nationalist claims. Rather, the paper examines how Palestinian citizens guard their dignity in the face of Israeli political expressions of indignity directed at them, tracing an increasing tension with these citizens’ articulation of their homeland nationalism—both in rhetorical responses to explicit indignities and in collective political actions asserting their belonging to their own homeland. Specifically, I consider several recent statements by Palestinian Knesset Members and politicians, and major collective actions, in order to investigate how, after nearly seven decades of experiencing policies and rhetoric intended to negate and break their ties to their homeland, the Palestinians in Israel invoke precisely this relationship to defend against indignity and to resist colonialis policies and reclaim, in the political sphere, Palestine as their homeland. As local and global movements challenging Israel’s legitimacy as an exclusively Jewish state expand, and Palestinians continue to assert their rights to their homeland, I theorize a homeland nationalism centered on politically reclaiming the homeland, as distinct from other minority nationalisms and legal and political claims of indigenous peoples elsewhere.

Palestinian citizens in an undetermined settler colonial project

There is an increasing body of scholarly work that examines Zionism and Israel in a settler-colonial framework (for just a few examples, see Lloyd 2012; Mamdani 2015; Pappé 2012; Robinson, 2013; Rouhana 2014; Sabbagh-Khoury 2015; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015; Shihade 2011; Veracini 2010; Wolfe 2006, 2012). This work adds much-needed comparative perspective and depth to our understanding of the Israeli state and society and the dynamics of Israel’s various relationships with the Palestinians—those in exile or under its military occupation, and those who are citizens of Israel. Keeping the comparative framework in mind while focusing specifically on the Palestinian citizens of Israel and pointing to major differences from
other cases can broaden our theoretical perspectives on Israeli settler colonialism.

In a recent article, Mamdani (2015) draws some important comparisons between the status of Palestinian citizens in Israel and that of American Indians. Indeed for Israel, the most recently established settler-colonial state, and for the United States (which Mamdani describes as the first settler-colonial state), mastery of the land characterized the struggle between the colonialis\-t\-st and the native. In both Israel and the United States, settlers dominate the land, but, in my view, this control manifests in different ways because the control of the entire Palestinian homeland is contested and resisted in the Israeli case. Both native groups gained citizenship in the respective states through legal mechanisms that reflect the settlers’ view of indigeneity: American Indians were ‘declared’ citizens in 1924 in the Indian Citizenship Act, thus they were considered naturalized citizens, as distinct from those who gained citizenship rights through birth. Palestinians in Israel were declared citizens in a similar act, the 1952 Nationality Law. This law immediately created two types of citizenship: one by virtue of birthright for Jews: and one for Arabs by a process akin to naturalization (Bishara, in press). Several other comparative studies note and explore the similarities of Israeli and other settler-colonial structures (Veracini 2010; Wolfe 2012). Veracini (2006), for example, finds the most significant parallel between Israel and South Africa by comparing the status of the Palestinian citizens of Israel with that of nonwhites under apartheid. He argues that the Palestinian citizens are starting to resemble ‘alien residents’ (p. 31).

These similarities notwithstanding, and given that this paper focuses on the location the homeland figures in native peoples’ nationalisms, including its emancipatory potential power, I want to investigate the differences between Israeli settler colonialism and other settler colonialisms. Particularly, I distinguish between what is perceived as ‘triumphed’ settler-colonial projects—in which the natives were conquered and subdued, such as North America and Australia—and the case of the Palestinian people, including the Palestinians in Israel. I will point to some fundamental differences between the Zionist project and other settler-colonial cases as a theoretical point of departure for why and how the Palestinian citizens in Israel are now using homeland nationalism to guard against a settler-colonial assault on their dignity, and how this is expanding to pose further challenges to the state. Homeland nationalism among the Palestinians in Israel is the process of reclaiming Palestine as their homeland (without denying the right of the Israeli people in a decolonized state). This claim leads to the translation of their psychological, cultural, and national belonging to their land into political claims to a homeland, even if the land is currently under Israel’s exclusive control. This homeland nationalism complements the broader Palestinian nationalism of claiming Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people (see Rouhana 2014).
Palestinians in Israel never questioned their psychological and national belonging to their homeland. But the emerging homeland nationalism takes this belonging, which has been expressed mainly in the cultural spheres (see Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury in press), into the political sphere. It represents a transformation of consciousness from the politics of minority status, minority rights, minority nationalism, and indigenous rights in the Israeli state to the politics of sharing the whole homeland and owning all of it with the Israeli Jews, a process that will naturally lead to demands for decolonization. The political implications of this transformation are far-reaching, but beyond the goals of this paper.

Mamdani is aptly aware of the limits of drawing parallels between Israeli and American settler colonialism. He sees these limits as emanating from the fact that ‘Indians lived in a world and time of the ascendancy of empire’ (Mamdani 2015, p. 18), and that we are now approaching the end of Western domination. This difference carries significant weight when we consider the possibility of the Zionist project’s ‘triumph’. I argue that the question of the ultimate outcome of Zionism has not yet been determined, and that this is a crucial variable in establishing the difference between the Palestinians in Israel and the subjects of settler-colonial projects in cases in which settler colonial projects are perceived to have ‘triumphed’. In thinking about this distinction, note the fact that many Israelis question the continued existence of a Zionist state, and neighboring states refuse to recognize Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state. Moreover, about 50% of Israel’s subjects—the Palestinians under its control, including those under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza and nearly 20% of its own citizens—do not recognize it as a Jewish state and actively resist its ongoing settler-colonial policies, and Palestinians in exile continue to demand to return to their homes.

There are many other reasons for the uniqueness of the Palestinian case and the limits and difficulties of drawing parallels with other ‘triumphed’ settler-colonial cases. The strategic geographical, national, cultural, and historical depth of the Palestinians within a re-emerging Arab Middle East that surrounds Palestine is exceptional. Natives in ‘triumphant’ settler projects did not have such depth. Support for Palestinian nationalism and rejection of Israel’s legitimacy as an exclusively Jewish state remains strong among Arab nations; Palestine has been, for many decades, a central Arab cause, at least as far as the Arab nations are concerned (Telhami 2008). Interestingly, the similarity in terms of the natives’ surrounding geopolitical environment lies with defeated settler colonial projects such as South Africa and Algeria, cases in which geopolitical support to the native population contributed to the defeat of the settler project—albeit in different ways.

Until the late 1960s, Palestinian nationalism was an integral part of Arab anti-colonial nationalism. As Khalidi (1997) has clearly shown, a national Palestinian identity anchored in the particular land of
Palestine emerged in the early 20th century. Zionism’s claim that Palestine was the homeland of Jews naturally sharpened this homeland-based identity in relation to all other diverse identities existing at the time (and today). This, however, did not weaken the Palestinians’ Arab identity. The fact that the Palestinian National Movement was the only Arab anti-colonial movement fighting on two fronts—against British colonialism and Zionist settler colonialism (Khalidi 1993)—only deepened this population’s ties to their homeland. Palestinian nationalism therefore did not only focus on gaining independence from British control, but also fought to save the homeland from being overtaken by the Zionist project. Once the Palestinians lost the struggle on both fronts in 1948, their continued resistance as well as their nationalism was dominated by a focus on regaining the lost homeland. Homeland nationalism among the Palestinians in Israel is, potentially, a part of the general Palestinian homeland nationalism that continued uninterrupted since the early 20th century.

Homeland nationalism in the case of the Palestinians in Israel renders attempts to frame their case in the context of indigenous studies of limited use unless it is broadened to a case of resisting an undetermined settler project. The historical contexts, as well as the contested issues, are fundamentally different. The current context is uninterrupted resistance to an ongoing but as-yet-undetermined Western-supported settler-colonial project in an era of declining American empire. Although the indigenous studies comparative frame can illuminate the predicament of some segments of the population, such as the Bedouins in the Naqab (Amara et al. 2013), highlighting the indigenous status of the Palestinian Bedouins as a separate case implicitly downplays the native status of the whole Palestinian people. Similarly, confining the conflict to local land rights and related issues without contextualizing these struggles, at least in political discourse, within the broader anti-colonial politics of rights over the homeland might lead to weakening homeland nationalism. Indeed, if one examines some of the work on indigeneity, one will notice that the Indigenous rights agenda centers on survival of culture, local land rights and rights to territories, self-government (in limited areas), and community preservation (see Champagne & Abu-Saad 2003). For example, Tsosie (2003) emphasizes the special relationship to land as giving ‘native people a sense of history, rootedness, and belonging’ (p. 4). These are important issues and indeed have some similarity to the situation that the Bedouin in the Naqab face. In a different way, but still in the context of ‘triumphed’ settler projects, Elkins and Pedersen (2005) in their edited volume on settler colonialism also premise their approach on the assumption that settler colonialism may be behind us. They are, instead, concerned with colonial legacies and their impact on the modern history and structure of settler-colonial projects that went on to become contemporary nation-states. Therefore, native communities’ struggles become domestic in nature, despite the international dimension that they are gaining, as reflected in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples from 2007 (see United Nations 2007), and are resolved within the
existing political order of the states they live within. Such conflicts, Elkins and Pedersen (2005) note, are around national policies. Therefore such conflicts do not undermine the essence of these states even if policy changes are envisioned. Jamal (2011), in his study of Arab minority nationalism, argues that Palestinian citizens in Israel, ‘following indigenous minorities in other states demand genuine collective indigenous rights, which complements the traditional struggle for equal individual citizenship rights’ (p. 5). His argument brings the importance of indigeneity into the discussion, and rightly critiques liberal theory’s treatment of assumptions about liberal justice. Mamdani (2015), critically, investigates the relationship between American discourse on US history and the ‘Indian question’. He argues that without recognizing the historical circumstances of native peoples on the one hand, and the American pioneering technology of settler colonialism on the other, dominant discourse fails to comprehend the limits of American citizenship. Thus, in order to reckon with this muted history, accounts that celebrate American history must also acknowledge the ways in which the American settler-colonial system continues to operate.

In the case of the ongoing and as-yet undetermined Israeli settler project, Palestinian indigeneity is not expressed only in conflict over state’s public policies; it is a form of resistance to the most fundamental premise of the project: the unaccommodating Zionist claim of the exclusive Jewish relationship to and ownership of Palestine. This premise itself becomes an assault on the natives’ dignity, around which resistance is generated. For the Palestinians in Israel, the Zionist claim over their entire homeland as the site of a settler political order is at the heart of their homeland nationalism.

The historical circumstances of the Palestinians in Israel and Israeli state policies have during the first decades of the state prohibited any expression of such nationalism: in political organization, explicit political ideology, and various forms of expression (see Robinson 2013). Only gradually, after nearly seven decades of defending the Palestinian narrative against all attempts of erasure, is the history of dispossession returning to occupy central stage in the political discourse (Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury in press). In the following section, I describe the particular kind of citizenship granted to the Palestinians in Israel and show how, in the context of such citizenship, homeland nationalism was suppressed completely for decades, and re-emerged in a way that complements Palestinian nationalism in general with its focus on reclaiming their homeland.

**Settler-colonial citizenship**

It is important to carefully examine the status of the Palestinians in Israel, because such an examination will help us understand the nature of their homeland nationalism. Mamdani (2015) compares their citizenship to that of American Indians; Veracini (2006) describes how they are perceived as ‘alien residents’; and Lloyd (2012, p. 60)
describes their citizenship as ‘shell-game formal citizenship while being denied the right to nationality’. Yet, mainstream voices in Israeli and Western academia rarely challenge Israel’s self-identification as a democratic state. The Western international political discourse uncritically accepts even Israel’s paradoxical self-identification as ‘Jewish and democratic’; indeed, to contest such understanding is an arduous task. Some of the more critical voices might concede that vis-à-vis the Arab citizens, Israeli democracy is somewhat tenuous and demonstrates internal frictions that are expected in any democratic state. To argue, however, that the state’s relationship with these Palestinian citizens is settler colonial in essence, rather than democratic, is to traverse an almost hitherto hermetic boundary. Indeed the citizenship Israel granted—in the context of its efforts to be admitted to the UN in 1949—to the Palestinians who survived the ethnic cleansing in their territory obfuscated the nature of the settler-colonial relationship with this population for many years.

Similarly, Zionist discourse in general recognizes some inequalities between Arabs and Jews within the state’s political framework and acknowledges some systemic discrimination against Palestinian citizens, but still maintains the virtues of Israeli democracy (Gavison 1999; Peleg & Waxman 2011; Smooha 1997). Yet critical scholarship examining the relationship between Israel and its Palestinian citizens has established that this citizenship lacks both meaning and substance (Jamal 2007; Molavi 2013; Sultany 2003). In this paper, I consider the Palestinians in Israel as both citizens and settler-colonial subjects; therefore, their relationship with Israel is conceived as settler-colonial citizenship (Rouhana in press; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2014).

Palestinians’ citizenship is constrained not only by discriminatory practices or ‘tensions’ emerging from Israel’s two main self-identification poles of Jewish and democratic. Israel confines the Palestinians’ citizenship to procedural boundaries, within which their citizenship has limited meanings. Thus, with the democratic rights to vote and run for office, Palestinian citizens enjoy procedural citizenship rights that Israel offers as evidence to support its claim of being a democracy—to its citizens as well as to the world. But this procedural citizenship has not halted Israel’s settler-colonial policies towards them. Thus Rouhane and Sabbagh-Khoury (2014), drawing from literature on settler colonialism (Veracini 2011; Wolfe 2006), show how Israel founded the blueprint of its settler-colonial policies during its first two decades. During this early period, the state put the Arab population under a military regime and employed the following policies: taking over land and appropriation of space; attempts at the erasure of history and culture; demographic riddance; strict limitations on political organization and repression of freedom of expression particularly of any sort of nationalism; and the establishment of an unshakable tyranny of the Jewish majority supported by constitutional law—all of which were and continue to be vehemently resisted by the Arab population. The outcome of a settler-colonial project and granting citizenship constructed a particular, and perhaps unique, type
of relationship between a settler-colonial state and an indigenous group—a relationship that I define as settler-colonial citizenship. Under these circumstances homeland nationalism developed gradually opposing major state obstacles and emerging as a main form of continued resistance to colonial policies.

Settler-colonial citizenship is the most the Zionist state could provide its Palestinian citizens, for to regard them as equal to Jewish citizens would call into question the entire history of settlement and indigenous displacement inherent to the Zionist project. Most importantly, settler-colonial citizenship aligns with the continuation of the settler-colonial project towards these citizens and with the epistemological and psychological infrastructure that generates attitudes that are conducive to the implementation of its policies using violent, legal, or ‘democratic’ means, as circumstances require. In addition to their tangible effects, these attitudes continually assault the dignity of the colonized. Fanon (1963), Lloyd (2012), and Said (2012), among many others—have cogently described the foundations of such attitudes and their multiple manifestations. In order to assert exclusive sovereignty over the land of Palestine, the Zionist movement, and later the Israeli state as its embodiment, has depended on modes of knowledge production that construct the Palestinian people as inferior, violent, or incapable of self-rule and sovereignty. This system of justification of the conquest and settlement of Palestine employed by Zionists has relied heavily upon negation of the native Palestinians, similar to other settler-colonial movements (Lloyd & Pulido 2010). This negation lends itself to pejorative views of the natives, views which are deeply embedded within the colonial project of Zionism. As Lloyd and Pulido (2010, p. 801) remark, ‘Ideologically, the constant proclamation of the inferiority of the colonized serves to justify the fact that even the most mediocre of the colonizers occupy a position of structural superiority’. Israeli views about Arabs are inseparable from the colonial project because, as Wolfe (2006, p. 388) has argued, ‘race is made in the targeting’, such that ‘so far as indigenous peoples are concerned, where they are is who they are, and not only by their own reckoning’. Thus, that Palestinians are seen as inferior and later on as violent is closely tied to their location, their belonging to the place, and their refusal to be dislocated from that place.

It is within this epistemological and psychological infrastructure that constant indignities are inflicted upon the Palestinian citizens. These persistent, everyday indignities emanate from the prolonged dynamics of denial, exclusion, and resistance. The more resistance the Palestinian citizens show, the more effort is exerted to maintain the denial, for if the denial collapses, the choice for Israeli society is stark: accept open racism as an integral fabric of the society, or face the reality of colonialism and transform to overcome it.
Zionism and the Palestinians’ relationship to their homeland: the indignity of denial

Prior to the 20th Israeli Knesset elections, the heads of most political parties running for office participated in a nationally televised debate broadcast live on prime time on February 26, 2015. All eight participants—seven Jewish and one Palestinian—were the heads of their party lists. All of the Jewish participants had previously served in the Israeli Knesset; six of them served as ministers in Israeli governments, and one was the leader of a left-wing party that had been part of the ruling coalition in the past. All of the Jewish participants in the debate were thus powerful actors and insiders to the Israeli political landscape. The sole Arab participant, Ayman Odeh, was the youngest and by far the least experienced in parliamentary politics—he had never been a member of the Knesset. However, he was now heading a list of candidates representing a coalition of three existing Arab parties, and this debate marked his first major appearance nationally, a rare event by itself for an Arab politician in Israel.

It is not unusual for an Arab political representative to be the ultimate outsider in the context of an Israeli national debate. Israeli Jewish politicians never consider Arab parties and their Knesset representatives as legitimate coalition partners; to the contrary, association with an Arab party by a Jewish party or politician serves to de-legitimize the latter in the eyes of the Jewish public. Furthermore, within a state where Jewishness is a defining pillar of the state identity and is the criterion for eligibility to many state privileges (both tangible and symbolic), the deep-seated Zionist identity is self-serving to the Jewish collective as it comes with colonialist privileges (Rouhana in press). In such a political reality, most Palestinian citizens are viewed as simply ‘non-Jews’ and their leaders as anti-Zionists within a system where Zionism is zealously expressed and celebrated.

Yet, during this nationally televised event, Avigdor Lieberman, the sitting Israeli foreign minister (and head of Yisrael Beitiinu, a right-wing party supported mostly by Russian immigrants), aggressively attacked Odeh. Lieberman accused him and all Arab citizens of being a ‘fifth column’ and asserted, ‘The Arab Knesset members represent terror organizations in the Israeli Knesset’. Then addressing Odeh directly, he asked, ‘Why did you come to a studio here [in Tel Aviv] and not in Gaza? Why are you here at all … you’re not wanted here … Go to [Palestinian President] Abu Mazen, he will pay your salary, unemployment fees, and benefits’ (Harkov 2015; Mualem 2015). At one point, when Odeh, who was listening calmly with a grim expression, noted, ‘We [Arab citizens] are 20% of the state population’, the foreign minister replied, under his breath, ‘for now’. This comment was a veiled reference to Lieberman’s oft-touted plan for population transfer, which would exchange Arab citizens in Israel for Jewish settlers in the occupied West Bank, across the 1967 Green Line.
That the Palestinian head of what went on to become the third largest party in Israel was attacked, insulted, and told outright by the foreign minister—live, on national television—that he is unwanted in his own homeland and that he should go to Gaza is not unusual in Israeli politics. Yet, it is a revealing micro-example of a fundamental mode of interaction between the colonialist and the colonized, a mode that I seek in this paper to examine and highlight, as it plays out within the Israeli reality and Palestinian homeland nationalism and politics of resistance.

This assault of the sitting foreign minister is possible and can be taken as 'normal' within the Israeli context because of the kind of citizenship that the Palestinians have been granted in Israel. This citizenship is grounded in a vital feature of Zionism—its claim of an exclusive right for the Jewish people to Palestine as a homeland. Obviously, this claim is inextricably related to the denial of Palestinian nationhood, but it is also distinctly different. Unlike the political exclusion from the state identity, it is the relationship to the homeland not only as a political concept but the place itself—the emotional and psychological symbolic value of belonging to the physical country—its hills, valleys, coasts, deserts, and fields—that is also denied. It is belonging to this place as their home that is negated. The fact that the claimed exclusive right to the homeland is justified on the basis of a biblical claim fuses the sacred into the settler colonial and further exacerbates the inherent colonial indignity being inflicted upon the Palestinian citizens. Mainstream Zionism denies the natives' very relationship with their own homeland and consequently seeks to destroy it. Thus, Israel doesn't consider the homeland itself—not only the political structure of the state—as the homeland of the Palestinian citizens in an equal or similar way to being the homeland of the Jewish citizens (and Jews who are not citizens). The claim of exclusive indigeneity and the fight to break the ties of the native people with their homeland is not unique to Zionist settlers. The unique aspect, however, is that even after settlers became to perceive themselves as natives this exclusive claim, as Pappé (2012) observed, has been a constant view. This includes the attitude that Arabs are foreigners and alien to the land and have been so since the Zionist project started despite all the changes in political structures, balances of power, and economic and global realities. This uniqueness, I argue, is precisely related to the uniqueness of what I consider an ongoing and undetermined settler-colonial project whose future is still at stake because of the persistent resistance it faces.

Within this remarkable Zionist claim of an exclusive relationship to the homeland, Palestinian citizenship is, by definition, devoid of patriotism—the emotional construct at the center of which is belonging to one's homeland, and obviously of nationalism as that is reserved to the Jewish people, as I discuss below. In order to have the satisfaction that patriotism provides, à la Zionism, the Arab citizens have to submit to the Zionist view that their homeland is, by the legitimacy of divine intention (or any other Zionist claim for legitimacy as, for example, argued by Gans 2008), the homeland of the Jewish
people (Nisan 2010). This does not mean that the Palestinian citizens don’t have their own patriotism that is grounded in their own relationship to their homeland as discussed below.

In order to instill in Jewish citizens that Israel, both as modern state and biblical promise, is the homeland of the Jews and the Jews only, the state generated a Zionist public consciousness through two closely interrelated processes. The first sought to indigenize the relationship of the Jews—both in Israel and around the globe—with the land, turning immigrants/settlers into the indigenous group upon arrival in the country or even before, as they are construed as potential natives, wherever they are born and wherever they reside (Masalha, 2007). When Jews immigrate to Israel or become settlers in the West Bank for example, in Zionist consciousness they are not ‘immigrating’ to Palestine but ‘returning’ to their ancestors’ homeland. They are ascending to the land (‘making aliya’)—hence their name in Hebrew (olim) means ascenders—to the homeland that belongs only to the Jewish people. This discourse among Zionists in Israel and Zionist communities across the world is taken for granted. The process of indigenizing the settlers in the Zionist case has been well discussed in the literature (Masalha 2007; Veracini 2010). But what has not been given sufficient attention is the enormous political and psychological impact on the native Palestinians of this unremitting claim of exclusive indigeneity.

The other side of this process is precisely the second objective that Zionists sought: to de-indigenize, at least in Zionist consciousness, the Palestinians from their own homeland. This process is as fundamental to this particular settler-colonial project as is the indigenization of the settlers, for only if the relationship of the Palestinians with their motherland is destroyed can the homeland become exclusively Jewish. This ambition has its roots not only in settler-colonial views but also, and perhaps mainly, in the fusion of the religious claims driving this project with its settler-colonial policies. This fusion has impacted the way that Zionism has gone about devising policies to achieve these two separate objectives with their respective processes. Zionist settler colonialism continues to draw heavily from a Jewish religious narrative to maintain this exclusive relationship (see Times of Israel Staff 2015).

The notion that the Jewish people have an exclusive right over the homeland has been translated into policies since the initiation of the Zionist project. The Jewish National Fund was established in Basel, Switzerland in 1901 in order to ‘redeem the land’ in Palestine from Arab owners (Wolfe 2012). Although this objective is completely consistent with the settler-colonial project, for the Fund to become ‘the custodian of the land for the Jewish people’, the clause stipulates that the Jewish ownership should be permanent (Katz 2002). This clause is based on biblical injunction that ‘the land shall not be sold in perpetuity’ (Leviticus 25:23, see Leon 2006, pp. 115-121). The concept of ‘land redemption’ itself—acquiring land from the Arab
inhabitants and transferring it to Jewish perpetual ownership—is infused with religious meaning, in addition to its clear colonial connotations. Bashir (2004) argues that even secular leaders like Ben-Gurion and Oseshkin fused the secular political meaning of acquiring the land with the religious biblical meaning, according to which the land will be rescued only if owned by Jews. This religious component helps explain the strong emphasis on the exclusive ownership of land and the exclusive right over the homeland.

The political implications of encoding this exclusive ownership into state action are immense. With the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, Israel took over their private and public property in the part of Palestine on which it was established—78% of historic Palestine. The Palestinians who managed to stay in what became Israel owned private and public land of their own. But Israel started a series of land expropriation waves, all supported by laws it legislated, in order to transfer the majority of the Palestinian land to Jewish hands. Today, Israel controls 93% of the land in the country; Arab citizens have no access to 80% of the state’s land; and Arab municipalities control only 2.5% of the total land (Yiftachel 2000).

This conception of exclusive ownership of the homeland by the Jewish people is closely related to the concept of ‘intruders’ that is used to describe Palestinian citizens who try to defend their ownership of land that the state claims. The term has been frequently used to describe resistance of Arab citizens against home demolitions in the Galilee and the Naqab. In one such case, an Arab village in the Naqab was demolished by Israel (and rebuilt by the community) over 80 times in an effort to take over the land (Silver 2015). The concept of ‘intruders’ is grounded in the idea that these citizens are foreigners to this land—the ‘national homeland’ of the Jewish people. It is this view that brought Israeli governments to introduce a new mechanism of settlements to protect the ‘land of the nation’ from their own citizens. In Galilee, about 40 mitzpeim (Hebrew plural for mitzpe, a look-out) were established for Jewish settlers on mountaintops to guard the land against Arab ‘intruders’ who ‘encroach’ on the land of the Jewish people. Individual settlements were created in the Naqab for the same reason—providing land to Jewish settlers to establish their own farms/settlements to guard against the ‘intruders’—the Arab citizens who seek to maintain ownership of their land.

Denying their relationship to the homeland was accompanied by the physical erasure of the Palestinian homeland as Palestinians knew it. In the official Zionist memory, as Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (in press) write, ‘Palestine was eliminated from the geography and history of the land as Zionism instilled new time and space coordinates. In Zionist space coordinates, names of geographical areas, towns, and places in Palestine were replaced with Zionist ones’ (see also, Benvenisti 2000). The reaction to the unbending settler-colonial two-pronged process of denial of the indigenous relationship with the homeland and the claim of the exclusive settler-indigeneity is not only
the insistence on indigeneity in the sense of belonging to the land, although it is part of it, but it is a homeland-based nationalism that emphasizes political belonging to the homeland—reclaiming it as a national home—that becomes a focus for future political thought, as defined above.

Denial of nationhood and the indignity of transfer and population exchange discourse

Israel, with more than six million Jewish citizens and close to 1.5 million Arab citizens, recognizes only one nationalism—albeit citizenship-crossing nationalism⁹: Jewish nationalism, which encompasses Jewish individuals and communities worldwide, with any citizenship in the world, and even if they do not claim to be a national group in their country of citizenship or want to be considered in Jewish national terms. At the same time, Palestinians in Israel are not recognized by the state as a national group. Furthermore, Israel by law doesn’t recognize the existence of an ‘Israeli nation’. So, the Jewish national identity is overemphasized, and the Palestinian national identity (or Arab national identity) is officially and politically denied.

Because of that denial, the Palestinians in Israel are deprived of the dignity of being called by their own names. While they emphasize their being ‘Palestinians’ or ‘Palestinian Arabs’, they are instead referred to variously as: ‘minorities’, ‘non-Jews’, ‘Muslims, Christians, and Druze’, ‘Israeli Arabs’, or Aravieh Yisrael meaning ‘Arabs of Israel’.

On October 2, 2013, The Israeli Supreme Court rejected the appeal of 21 Israeli citizens to be registered as ‘Israelis’ in the Population Registry’s ‘nationality’ category. Upholding the ruling of a lower court, it argued ‘that there was no proof of the existence of a uniquely “Israeli” people’ (Hovel 2013). The court reiterated arguments made 40 years earlier in a similar case (see, Gross 2013). Agreeing with the other two justices in the case, Justice Melcer argued, quoting an earlier similar case, that ‘it has not been proven that, legally, there exists an ‘Israeli nation’ and it is not appropriate to encourage the creation of new fractions of a nation’ (Hovel 2013). So, by law, Israel does not allow civic nationalism that can include Jews and Arabs (and others).

What about the Arab citizens’ national identity? If they are excluded from the possibility of civic nationalism, and are not recognized as a national group, what are they in Israel’s eyes? In 2007, Tzipi Livni, Israel’s Foreign Minister (who also served as vice prime minister at the time), made it absolutely clear that Israel is the homeland of one nationalism only. Instead, she declared, if the Arab citizens seek national identity, the homeland of the Jewish people is not the place. The place is in the Palestinian state that should be established in ‘Judea and Samaria’ (biblical names for the Israeli-occupied West
Borderlands 14:1

Bank) and Gaza. Israel, she argued, is the national home of the Jewish people wherever they are—Jewish-Israeli citizens, and ‘sons (sic.) of the Jewish people in the diaspora, also if they are citizens of other countries’ (Knesset Proceedings, Session 176, 17th Knesset, December 3, 2007). The Palestinian state that she hopes will be established next to Israel will be ‘the national home to the Palestinian people wherever they are’. This includes the Palestinian citizens of Israel: ‘Their national aspirations’, she says of these citizens, will be fulfilled by the establishment of the Palestinian state’ (ibid.). This is a carefully stated position presented by the Israeli vice prime minister in the Israeli Knesset.

These are not only colonial expressions of indignity towards the indigenous Palestinian citizens, but are thinly veiled threats. They permeate the Zionist public discourse and remind Palestinians of their traumatic experience of expulsion, on the one hand, and that they are unwelcome and unwanted, not to mention unrecognized as a collective national group, on the other. Furthermore, it is this indignity and denial that opens the road for possible political plans for expulsion and ethnic cleansing. For example, Israel’s political system embraced, as a minister in the Israeli government, a political leader—Rehavam Ze’evi, whose party openly called for the transfer of the Palestinians from ‘Eretz Yisrael’. Because the idea most associated with him and his party is the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, his party became known among Arabs and Jews as the ‘transfer party’. He called it ‘voluntary transfer’, but what he meant was well understood: the state should constrain the Palestinians economically, educationally, and in other ways until they decide to leave on their own (Weitz & Levian 2012). Lest the young generations in Israel think that Minister Ze’evi represents a marginal voice, his ‘legacy’ became memorialized by law. His name has been venerated by naming public gardens, streets, a highway, and a prize conferred by the Ministry of Education after him, and by having his ‘legacy’ studied in Israeli schools upon the direction of the Ministry of Education (Weitz & Levian 2012). In one of the Knesset memorials for Ze’evi, in October 2013, the current defense Minister, Moshe Yaalon, declared: ‘It could be that Gandhi’s [Ze’evi’s nickname] opinions were ahead of their time, and the fact that many people have sobered up in recent years is proof of this’ (Haaretz Editorial 2013). Israel’s former President, Mr. Peres, said, ‘For years, the Eretz Yisrael scene has missed Rehavam’s Zeevi’s presence’. He added that the absence of ‘his clear voice [has] left a void in the public discourse’ (Weitz & Levian 2012).

Similarly, the longtime Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, and his party, Yisrael Beitinu, espouse population exchange—exchanging Palestinian citizens of Israel with Israeli settlers in the West Bank (as further discussed below). Paradoxically, it is their citizenship, even if settler-colonial citizenship, that presents some safeguard, even if insecure, against such a possibility. Yet threats abound. Israeli Jewish Knesset members often scream at their Arab counterparts in the Knesset to ‘Go to Gaza’ or ‘Go to Syria’ in verbally violent scenes that have become too frequent and bad-mannered. These have even
included physical attacks in the plenary of the Knesset on a female Arab Knesset member, who was defended from physical abuse at the hands of her Jewish Zionist colleagues only by the Knesset guards.

Arab Knesset members defend against this assault on the relationship with their homeland with the strongest defense of all—stressing their own homeland nationalism and challenging that of their Zionist attackers, even if such defense has the potential of intense confrontation with those in power—the colonizers.

3. Guarding dignity and Palestinian political expressions of homeland nationalism

a. Political rhetoric

Returning to the televised debate reported above, I argue that the interaction between the Zionist Knesset members and the Arab candidate embodies a fundamental settler-colonial attitude towards the native population and encapsulates the nature of the settler-colonialist indignities inflicted upon the colonized and the extremes to which they can reach. At the same time, this interaction encapsulates what I argue to be an example of a political awareness the native brings to the interaction to uphold his or her dignity and resist colonialist policies—homeland nationalism, an awareness that emanates expressly from indigeneity.

Lieberman’s conduct towards the Palestinian candidate is not only symbolically violent. The explicit insults aimed at humiliating the Palestinian head of the list. His statement expressed a clear message: You do not belong to this homeland; this is not your home, this is my home and therefore I can ask you to leave. Three observations on Lieberman’s behavior are worth exploring. First, in an elections debate, it is safe to assume that Lieberman wanted to attract Israeli voters to his party. If this is the case, then the very fact that Israeli voters find such attitudes appealing points to the deep-seated colonialist attitudes and feelings within this society towards the native Arab citizen. Indeed, public opinion polls show that these wishes for Arabs to vanish have been prevalent among Israeli Jews for a very long time. Peleg and Waxman (2011) summarize some of the data conducted by various Israeli scholars. One study of Israeli-Jewish opinion conducted just prior to the 1967 War found that 80% of Israeli Jews agreed with the statement, ‘It would be better if there were fewer [Arabs in Israel].’ By 1968, the number had risen to 91%. In another study from 1980, 50% of Israeli Jews thought the state should encourage Arabs to leave the country, a figure that declined only slightly to 44% by 2004. In a survey taken in 2003, 33% of the Israeli Jewish public expressed full support for the expulsion of the Arab citizens from Israel. The slightly less objectionable option of ‘voluntary transfer’ was supported by 57% in 2003, a percentage that increased to 62% by 2006. In 2007, another survey found that 30% of the Israeli Jewish public supported Lieberman’s plans for transfer ‘of as many
Arabs as possible’. These attitudes are consistent with the settler-colonial policies of demographically reducing the indigenous population, which Israel has applied since its establishment.

Second, it is insufficient to conceive of this interaction simply as the expression of a right-winger, of the type of statements made by right-wing politicians of the likes of Marie Le Pen, the National Front leader in France, or her father Jean-Marie Le Pen, or Jörg Haider in Austria. Lieberman was a senior partner in the right-wing coalition led by Mr. Netanyahu, and he was mentioned by the mainstream press as a potential coalition partner within the so-called Israeli ‘center-left’ coalition led by Herzog (Times of Israel Staff 2014). This by itself reflects the realities in Israel that such discourse, while being distasteful to some, is viewed as completely acceptable by the majority of Jewish Israelis.

Third, it is revealing that only one participant in the whole debate found it appropriate to draw attention to Lieberman’s language and object to it—Zehava Galon of the small ‘Zionist-left’ Meretz party. Galon, calling Lieberman ‘racist’ and ‘transferist’, observed how easily Lieberman’s statements passed. None of the other participants expressed any objection to them. While this is not proof that the debaters agreed with such statements, it certainly indicates that they did not find the statements offensive enough for them or for their constituencies to consider distancing themselves from them.

Furthermore, the whole debate was laced with numerous exclusionary expressions, for example: the ‘Jewish state’ needs to ‘increase aliyah [immigration of Jews] and the Jewish birthrate needs to rise in order to counter the danger of an Arab majority in some areas in the Galilee’; emphasizing Jewish symbols; Jewishness; Eretz Yisrael (referring to the whole of historic Palestine by its Hebrew biblical name); Am Yisrael (a Hebrew biblical phrase used to refer to the entire Jewish people by calling them ‘the people of Israel’); and Torat Yisrael (a Hebrew biblical phrase used to refer to the Jewish bible). When the statement ‘We are all Jews’ was voiced and repeated by one of these leaders during the debate, not a single one of the others felt the need to point out that there was a Palestinian citizen also seated at the table. Odeh himself drew attention to it in his statements, to which I will return.

The Lieberman exchange chronicled above included two additional key details marked by irony, considering the settler-colonial context. First, although Lieberman told the Palestinian parliamentary candidate that he is not wanted and that his place ‘is not here’, he himself was born in Europe (Kishniv, Russia, now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978 in what the settler-colonial project constructed as aliyah. Furthermore, this aliyah gave Lieberman the right to be a settler in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967; he lives in the West Bank settlement of Nokdim. Thus, the European colonizer is telling the native that he has no place in his own homeland.
The second irony is that the Arab candidate represents a party (within the joint Arab list) that considers the two-state solution a fundamental pillar of its political program. His party, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (an Arab-Jewish party)—recognizes the 1947 UN partition plan that proposed dividing Palestine into two states, one Jewish state and one Arab. It has adhered to the notion of ‘two states for two peoples’ since the 1947 United Nations General Assembly resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine. It is not a party that sees the conflict through a settler-colonial prism; on the contrary, it raises the flag of Arab-Jewish brotherhood and sisterhood within an Israeli framework in which it often considers itself the real left.

Even so, during moments such as those described in this publicly televised political interaction, when the relationship of the Arab native to his or her homeland is directly challenged, he or she resorts to indigeneity discourse that in effect reflects a settler-colonial analysis. Thus, Odeh listens to these offensive remarks quietly, with a soft smile, raising his head with some signs of pity—perhaps. Then he responds that he does not know who is not wanted based on the polls; but says: ‘I am very wanted in my homeland. I am part of the nature, part of the landscape, I resemble it’. This simply means, ‘this is my homeland and I am indigenous’ (and implies ‘you are not’). This is a remarkable comment to come from a leader of this particular party—the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality that doesn’t see the conflict through a settler colonial prism. Odeh had to resort to his indigeneity, in the political sense of homeland, to protect his dignity and the dignity of the constituency he represents. It seems as if he came close to telling Israel’s foreign Minister, ‘I belong here and you do not’. Later, responding to the statements made by another Minister that ‘we are all Jews’, he invokes the same rhetoric and mixes it with his party’s particular line, which emphasizes equality. He says, ‘I am the son of Mount Carmel, the son of Galilee, I am so proud of my national belonging. Why don’t we hear you saying that we are all human beings; we are all citizens?’

While the Israeli foreign minister told the Arab candidate on a live TV debate that he was unwanted, earlier, another Arab Knesset member was literally kicked out, live on air, from the studio by one of the most prominent Jewish interviewers in the country. MK Jamal Zahalka, a leader of one of three Arab parties that subsequently ran as one list in 2015, was interviewed on a major TV channel by Dan Margalit on December 31, 2009, during Israeli’s Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip. The dialogue was intense and the interviewers dismissed Zahalka’s answers to questions about demonstrations by Arab citizens in protest of Israel’s war on Gaza. At one point, Zahalka mentioned the number of Palestinian children killed in Gaza, and Margalit retorted, ‘What else can you do when Hamas is firing [from Gaza]?’ When Zahalka answered that Ehud Barak (Israel’s Defense Minister at the time) ‘listens to classical music and kills children’, Margalit answered, ‘This is rudeness’. (The word in Hebrew, the language in which the interview was conducted, is chutzpah. The Hebrew meaning has the connotation of being blatantly rude to
somebody who is of a higher rank, position, or status. The English translation doesn’t convey the intensity of the Hebrew word.) Zahalka raises his voice, saying ‘Please do not say rudeness [chutzpa].’ The conversation deteriorated and got loud. Margalit then ended the interview abruptly and told Zahalka, repeatedly, that he was insolent and rude. Zahalka replied, ‘Do not say rudeness, you are here to ask questions’. Things escalated to the point where Zahalka was kicked out of the studio with Margalit telling him, ‘Now you get out of here. Bye bye’. At one point, Margalit was heard saying, ‘Don’t touch him, don’t touch him’, apparently to an unseen third party who was trying to remove the Knesset member from the studio by force. On Zahalka’s way out, Margalit turned to the other interviewer and tried to introduce the next topic and then said, ‘Did you see this rude [hatsouf in Hebrew] one who says Barak is a child murderer?’ to which Zahalka was heard shouting on his way out, ‘Do not say hatsouf’ and Margalit repeated, ‘Come on, just get out of here!’ while using hand gestures to emphasize his message. Zahalka screamed back ‘Do not say get out!’ Zahalka then resorted to his homeland nationalism to protect his dignity, and the dignity of his constituents who were watching, as he is expelled from the TV studio, saying that this homeland is his and that he is the indigenous here (implying that the Zionist interviewer is a settler who cannot kick him out). He screamed from outside the studio, but was nonetheless heard to say, ‘Don’t say get out of here; here in Sheikh Munis’ (referring to the destroyed Palestinian town on which the TV studio was built). This reclamation of homeland, of course, made the Israeli interviewer even more outraged, so he retorted: ‘Aha, the truth is out, you want to occupy here!’ and screamed at him, ‘Bye bye’. Zahalka at this point said clearly while screaming from outside the studio: ‘I want to live with you in real democracy and real equality. I am the son of this homeland, who are you? You are an immigrant’. The act of a Zionist interviewer humiliating and kicking out the Arab MK (an action that would be completely unthinkable towards a Jewish MK) prompted Zahalka to articulate the settler-colonial dynamics of domination and dispossession. Of all the possible ways of guarding his dignity in the face of a humiliating setting, he chose to invoke his indigeneity and articulate his homeland nationalism—his relationship to his homeland that the European immigrant has expropriated. In my exploratory research on reactions to similar indignities, I found that Palestinian political figures consistently use this pattern of invoking homeland nationalism, centered around indigeneity, in the face of such indignity.

Discussing proposals by Knesset members to annul the citizenship of an Arab citizen, MK Ahmad Tibi in the Knesset plenary asks: Why is it that when an Arab citizen is accused of a violation, the (Zionist) Knesset members start threatening to annul his citizenship? (MrTibitube 2014). Then he addresses MK Rotem, the particular Knesset member who issued such threats, by saying, ‘We say that we are the salt of this land, this homeland is ours; we do not, Knesset member Rotem, leave this country for Milky. Why? Because this homeland is ours’ (MrTibitube 2014). Tibi is referring here to the debate in Israeli society about the increasing number of Israelis who
leave the country, particularly to Berlin in Germany, because of the high prices in Israel, including the prices of certain food staples (see Rudoren 2014). This is a sarcastic hint by Tibi, implying that an indigenous population who belongs to the homeland does not leave it because of the mere inconvenience of high prices. The newcomers, Israeli Zionists, by contrast, leave when the going gets a little tough (i.e., prices get higher), because they are not deeply attached to the homeland like the indigenous people are. It is worth noting again that this intense response and its implications are invoked in the face of levying the very dire threat of annulling citizenship—kicking an Arab citizen out of his homeland.

In numerous instances, Jewish Knesset members have told Arab Knesset members to go to Syria or go to Gaza, to which Palestinian Knesset members usually respond by saying, ‘You go back to where you came from!’ or ‘We were here before you’. In one such case, during a Knesset committee meeting, when the most prominent Arab Knesset member, Azmi Bishara, a towering Arab intellectual and a charismatic leader, was told to go to Syria by a Zionist MK, he simply answered with a direct harsh curse.

Arab MKs have shown themselves to be willing to confront the Prime Minister himself with the same defense if he uses the same indignity and denies their relationship to their homeland. In October 2014, after the Israeli police shot an Arab citizen in the back in an Arab town in Galilee inside Israel, there were numerous demonstrations against police brutality and their rapid readiness to use their guns when it comes to Arab demonstrators. Speaking in the Knesset, MK Basel Ghattas said that the Prime Minister threatens to annul the citizenship of Arabs who are protesting nonviolently and ‘send them to Palestine’. Addressing the Prime Minister directly, Ghattas says: ‘Mr. Prime Minister, we are in Palestine. I am here in my homeland, and the name of my homeland for ages has been Palestine, even if a different political framework was established here. We will stay here and you will go away, and your government will go away’ (Knesset proceedings, Session 175, 19th Knesset, November 10, 2014). Of course by saying ‘you will go away’, Ghattas played on the double meaning—going away [politically] as a prime minister, or going away [departing] as a settler. But, as with the other responses mentioned above, there is a noteworthy boldness in the willingness to address the Prime Minister directly, by expressly telling him who is indigenous in his homeland and who came and changed the name of Palestine, and by using the double language about who will stay and who will leave. When it comes to the relationship with the homeland, the Palestinian citizens seem empowered—even if facing the Prime Minister—by their homeland nationalism.

A yet even more explicit reference occurred when MK Zahalka was on the Knesset podium expressing his objection to a bill regarding a Basic Law that will require a referendum on the future of the occupied territories. He was repeatedly heckled by Jewish Knesset members
who were saying, ‘This is the homeland of the Jewish people’. When he answered a particular Knesset member that ‘We were here before you’, and then continued with ‘and we will be here after you’, a storm erupted in the Knesset. The Prime Minister himself asked to take to the podium to specifically make a statement about Zahalka’s comment. The Prime Minister simply said: ‘Mr. Speaker and Knesset members, I had no intention to speak, but I heard MK Zahalka’s statement that “We were here before you and we will be here after you”. The first part is not correct, and the second part will not happen’ (Knesset Proceedings, Session 60, 19th Knesset, July 31, 2013.) The fact that the Prime Minister saw the need to take to the podium to make his short statement only points out the enormous importance for Zionist leaders of the Palestinian political claim of their homeland.

The active denial of their relationship to their homeland brought the desperately divided Arab parties, at the time, to an unprecedented show of defiance at the Knesset podium. The occasion was the discussion of an Israeli bill called ‘the Arrangement of Bedouin Settlement in the Naqab’, also known as the Prawer Plan, which calls for the removal of tens of thousands of Arab citizens from their traditional lands in the Naqab and their concentration in ‘planned towns’ in order to expropriate their land. When discussing the bill on June 24, 2013, Arab Knesset members took to the podium, one after another and in a coordinated move, each one ended his or her statement by ripping up the bill before the Knesset (and being removed from the session after this act). In their statements, some of them questioned, ‘how can it be called (land) settlement?’ and stated, ‘We were here before you’ (Knesset Proceedings, Session 44, 19th Knesset, June 24, 2013). One of them, in a rather theatrical move, poured a glass of water on the bill draft he had just ripped and said an Arabic idiom in Arabic, ‘Just soak it in water and drink the water afterwards’, which means, ‘this is worth absolutely nothing’.

The powerful message from this rather dramatic performance and the show of unity among all Arab parties signifies that when it comes to attacks on their relationship with their homeland, Arab Knesset members demonstrate a lack of respect for Zionist law. After all, this legal system has expropriated the vast majority of their land. It is worth noting that despite the Palestinian citizens’ consensus to operate within the framework of Israeli law (Rouhana 1989), when it comes to a law that challenges their connection to their homeland, they are willing to defy it in the most public, dramatic, and rebellious means at their disposal. They are, indeed, deeply aware of the limits of their parliamentary work and its hopelessly minimal impact within the tyranny of the Zionist majority. Furthermore, with this collective action they moved the issue of the Bedouin from a local ‘land rights’ issue to an issue that fit their homeland nationalism.
b. Collective political action and homeland nationalism

The discussion of how homeland nationalism is rhetorically invoked to maintain dignity in the face of colonialisit indignities is not meant to imply that political rhetoric, which obviously reflects a deep-seated worldview, is the only or main manifestation of the power of homeland nationalism as means of resistance. Homeland nationalism increasingly and more explicitly guided the organized political action of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Thus while collective protests against Israel’s policies until the 1990s were framed within what I call elsewhere the ‘equality paradigm’—seeking equal citizenship within the Israeli state (Rouhana & Sabbagh Khoury, 2014)—the 1990s witnessed the beginning of a transformation towards political homeland nationalism. Similarly, public political attitudes seem to reflect homeland nationalism, and get particularly expressed in the context of their relationship with their homeland. Indeed, this type of nationalism is at the core of resistance to fundamental Zionist policies that threaten or challenge the relationship with the homeland. Below, I provide three major examples of political actions and one example of collective political attitudes towards such policies.

The first-ever nationally organized political action of the Palestinians in Israel was in defense of their relationship to their homeland. In March 1976, the representative bodies of the Arab citizens declared a national strike to protest Israel’s government expropriation of their public and private lands (Bashir 2006; Nakhleh 2013). The Zionist project targeted land as described above, and land became the symbol of the homeland for the colonized, as in other places (Veracini 2013). Since that year, the event, which became known as Land Day, has been commemorated annually by strikes, organized marches, or major demonstrations. The power of this event (and its annual commemoration) is derived from the express relationship between land, indigeneity, and homeland nationalism. Thus, expropriating their land was seen as threatening their relationship to their own homeland—taking it away—and ignoring their status as what they call ‘the original owners of the homeland’. This connection, and the emphasis on attachment to homeland, is well articulated in the public political discourse about Land Day (Bashir 2006; Nakhleh 2013). The original demonstration in 1976 was framed within the ‘equality paradigm’, in which opposition to Israel’s land expropriation policies was based on demands for equal citizenship. But gradually, land issues and the whole of the events surrounding the Land Day commemorations became framed as rights over one’s homeland—or right to equality emanating from the right over the homeland. Thus homeland nationalism began to replace the ‘equality paradigm’. The fact that the commemorative marches become the site of speeches stressing homeland nationalism, with the Arab public raising Palestinian flags, the flags of their own homeland, is the clearest indication of the power of indigeneity when it becomes political and its potential as a source of nationalism and group dignity in the face of settler-colonial policies. It is worth noting that Land Day became an all-Palestinian commemoration; Palestinian communities everywhere
(including Gaza, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and in exile) honor it as a day of confirming their relationship with their shared homeland.

The second example, which shows the depth of homeland nationalism, is the annual commemoration of the Palestinian Nakba on Israel’s Day of Independence by organizing ‘The March of Return’. The annual march which is the most prominent event in a month of cultural and political activities and gatherings, started in the 1990s and gradually became a central event to celebrate the Palestinians’ relationship to their homeland and their right over it. Thousands of Palestinian citizens of all ages march to the ruins of one, of the hundreds, of destroyed Palestinian villages—a different village every year. In a ritual of symbolic return they hold a rally, with Palestinian flags and names of the destroyed villages, and with slogans and speeches calling for the return of Internally Displaced Palestinians to their villages and the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland (See Image 1). They stress their status as the original owner of the land and their right over it.

Tracing the emergence of this march during this period, Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury (in press) describe how the repressed history of the Nakba returned to engulf the political consciousness of the Palestinian elites in Israel. I argue that homeland nationalism is vital for this return. The annual march started after the 1993 Oslo agreements between Israel and the PLO when, according to which it was understood that Palestinians in Israel were left out as an internal Israeli issue. It is then that the political meaning of their relationship with their homeland, and with the state that claims it exclusively for the Jewish people, started to gradually take center place.

The ‘March of Return’ symbolizes more than any other event how the Palestinian homeland, the history of its loss, and the importance of reclaiming it are dominating the collective Palestinian discourse and consciousness. This consciousness embodies a political statement that the historical outcome of the Nakba is not a bygone and that it is resisted and should be rectified. The return to the homeland that the march symbolizes is not derived from an ‘equality paradigm’ as much as a reclamation of the homeland itself. Thus the slogan, ‘Your day of independence is our day of Nakba’, which became the slogan of the annual march, while undermining the historical foundation of the Zionist state also brings the main outcomes of the Nakba—such as losing the homeland—to the forefront of collective political action, even if at the commemorative level. Unlike the first example of Land Day in which popular protest started as collective action framed as a demand for equality, the March for Return started and developed further as collective political action guided, explicitly, by homeland nationalism.
The third example relates to the Prawer Plan mentioned above—a proposal that will forcibly relocate Palestinian Bedouin in the Naqab from their villages to ‘planned towns’. The bill was approved in its first reading by a majority in the Knesset (each bill must be approved three times to become a law), during the same meeting at which Arab Knesset members tore up the bill draft on the Knesset podium. The Israeli government does not recognize the legal right of the Bedouin—who live in 35 unrecognized villages in the Naqab—on their land (Amara 2014; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015; Yiftachel 2013). As Israel considers this land ‘state land’, these towns—many of which precede Israel’s establishment—are denied state recognition (and consequently state services). The state considers the inhabitants intruders on the ‘land of the nation’. Israel’s claim to be modernizing and developing the Naqab by taking land from the Arabs and offering it to Jewish settlers for free through various mechanisms including ‘individual settlements’, an offer too transparent to be seen as anything other than an indignity to the Arab citizens (Human Rights Watch 2008). Thus a public opinion poll among a random sample of the Palestinian citizens of Israel conducted in 2013 revealed that 17% believed that Israeli actions in the Naqab were a matter concerning the relationship between citizens and the state in the context of urban planning, while 82% saw in it a continuation of the Palestinian Nakba and efforts to transfer Palestinians from their lands (Atrash 2013).

The reaction to the plan and to the bill was swift, largely from the younger generation of Palestinian citizens dealing with this issue from the perspective of homeland nationalism, not as merely a local land rights case. Thus a general strike for all Palestinian citizens was declared on July 15, 2013. Yet it was the younger generation,
influenced by the revolutions across the Arab world at the time, who led major demonstrations and activities (see Anabtawi 2015). Youth groups were organized and announced their slogan: ‘Prawer will Not Pass’. Using social media, the groups, which emerged spontaneously, organized a series of what they called ‘Days of Rage’ in various parts of the country, including the Naqab and Haifa, to protest the plan through demonstrations. The activities received support from Palestinian groups outside Israel and from groups in 20 European and Arab countries. After Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shelved the plan ‘for now’ (Azulay 2013), this form of activism began to be discussed in Palestinian circles as a model to emulate in promoting all-Palestinian homeland nationalism.

In evaluating why this particular activist initiative became a success, it was clear that a major factor was that the issue itself—the homeland, land, and the home (demolitions)—immediately became a nationalist issue that galvanized Arab youth organizations across the country (Anabtawi 2015). The support they received from the Arab leadership was inevitable, given the consensus on this homeland-based nationalistic cause. Homeland nationalism framed the natives’ ‘rage’ against expropriating the relationship with the homeland, and became a source of dignity in facing settler-colonial policies.

The last example I use to support the point about homeland nationalism as resistance to colonial indignities is the Palestinian citizens’ attitudes towards ideas advocated by Israeli politicians to carry out ‘population exchange’. This proposal, appearing as early as 1996, has called for swapping, in the context of a political settlement with the Palestinians, territories in Israel that are populated with indigenous Arab citizens with settlements populated illegally with Jewish colonialists in the occupied West Bank (for details, see Ari’eli, Schwartz & Tagari 2006; for legal discussion, see Waters 2007). After Arab legislators heard about internal discussions on population exchange that had taken place during a meeting between Labor and Likud Knesset members, they demanded that they be able to deliberate the plan in the Knesset.xvi In a Knesset discussion that subsequently took place in November 1996 in response to their demand, Labor and Likud members who had attended the meeting in question argued that the plan was not really ‘discussed’ during the meeting but rather merely mentioned ‘lightly’ by one MK participant, and that others present had dismissed the comment. Yet Arab Knesset members, including one from the Labor party, contended in the Knesset discussion that this was a serious matter, that it demonstrates that their citizenship is not taken seriously, and that they will never allow such plans to be implemented. They all invoked their relationship and belonging to their homeland in rebuking this ‘indignant’ and ‘humiliating’ proposal. One Arab Knesset member, who came from the largest Arab town included in the plan, said in the Knesset discussions: ‘We are the authentic sons [sic] of this homeland. We live in it, love it, work the land for thousands of years. We plant olive trees, hug the fig trees, and hit deeper roots. This is our nationalism as we understand it—basic, homeland-based, and
rooted within this land’ (Knesset Proceedings, Session 41, 14th Knesset, November 20, 1996).

Since 1996, the transfer plan has gained the support of various Israeli politicians. Israeli negotiators even brought this proposal to formal negotiations with the Palestinians. The current chief advocate of this plan is Israel’s former foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, the head of the Yisrael Beiteinu party. But the plan is also widely supported by many Israeli academics and politicians. Major Israeli academics from leading universities have asserted that, ‘only such a land exchange formula could assure Israel’s long-term viability as a Jewish state’ (Arad 2006, p. 6). This assertion, ‘underlines what has essentially become consensual in Israel, at times explicitly and at times implicitly, along the full Israeli political spectrum—left, center and right’ (ibid. p. 6). The plan openly seeks to buttress the Jewish majority in the Zionist state through demographic manipulations and by reducing the number of Arab citizens.

In January 2014, Mr. Lieberman, in his capacity as Israel’s foreign minister, announced that he would not support a settlement with the Palestinians unless it includes ‘the exchange of Israeli Arab land and population’—a demand he deemed a ‘basic condition’ (Ravid 2014). Lieberman clarified that he had already made his position known to the international community. Indeed, in September 2010, Lieberman, as Foreign Minister, presented his plan at the United Nation’s General Assembly (Ravid 2010).

The widespread support that such ideas enjoy among the Zionist political class explains why the Israeli foreign minister can freely and unhesitatingly promote and advocate them publicly (Arad 2006). It also explains why the Palestinian citizens would be deeply concerned about such plans: In 2003, 50% expressed concern about these plans, and by 2012, this number had jumped to 66% (Smooha 2013). Their concern can be understood in light of Israel’s history of ethnic cleansing, motivated by the same widely accepted logic of the transfer plan: reducing the number of Arabs in the Jewish state. For the purposes of this paper, it is the colonial indignity of the plan and the consensual Zionist support it receives that is under consideration. The plan demonstrates that the Palestinian citizens, whatever democratic rights they enjoy, are in essence settler-colonial citizens who can openly be the subject of demographic manipulation or demographic riddance. This plan reflects the essence of settler-colonial citizenship and the indignities it entails: Palestinian citizens are perceived to enjoy citizenship only by the grace of the majority. It implies that their citizenship is not theirs by right but conferred as a favor by the majority, with the implication that what has been granted can be taken away. (Indeed Palestinians have a different kind of citizenship than Jews, as described in Bishara (in press)). So much was declared officially in the Knesset by no less than, Yaron Mazuz, the deputy Minister of Interior. Speaking on June 24, 2015 from the rostrum in the name of the government and in the presence of the Prime Minister,
Mazuz responded to a request by Arab Knesset members to cancel an article in a law which had just been approved for extension by the Knesset (a law prohibiting a Palestinian without Israeli citizenship from living in Israel with his or her Israeli-citizenship holding spouse). In the heated debate, he called on Arab Knesset members to return their identity cards (revoke their citizenship) and stated, ‘We are doing you people a favor by even allowing you to be seated here’ (Lis 2015). The Prime Minister took the stage to speak but did not refer to the deputy minister’s request of the Arab Knesset members. Aida Touma, the Arab Knesset member who responded from the rostrum, declared that her identity card is a certificate that she is indigenous to this place and reminded the Knesset that her father lived in this land before the state that granted her that identity card was established.

The population exchange plan is strongly opposed by the Arab citizens. When a survey conducted in the towns under consideration by the plan inquired about interviewees’ reactions to the plan, if implemented, 71% of the sample said that their reaction would be ‘forceful’; 90% rejected it (Mada al-Carmel 2004). Israeli Interpretations of the Arab citizens’ opposition to these plans focused on instrumental explanations related to the social benefits the Arabs in Israel receive as citizens of the state; the lower standard of living in the Palestinian territories; and the democratic rights they enjoy in Israel (Glazer 2014).

There are, of course, numerous possible reasons for such reactions. Some argue that because the plan stipulates that the Arab citizens be transferred with their lands and towns, their objection must be rooted in material loss related to standard of living in Israel; loss of some benefits that Israel provides; or fear of instability and the political regime in the Palestinian territories. While these factors might explain the views of some, what this analysis lacks is the fundamental factor of homeland nationalism that explains the Palestinians’ opposition. These explanations miss the most important point in the strong opposition of those in the towns concerned and of the Palestinians in Israel. The opposition is related to the dignity of being able to claim their own homeland and how such proposals grossly violate their identity and history. The City Council of the largest Arab town (Umm al-Fahm) mentioned in the exchange plan gave what I think is the final word about the reason for people’s opposition: ‘We are the children of this land. We inherited it from our ancestors’. Furthermore, this homeland nationalism as expressed here gives the people the power of defiance, as they state that, ‘Nobody can speak or negotiate on our behalf in any future agreement with the Palestinians’ (Khoury 2014). Thus, they will defy not only Israel but also the Palestinian Authority, were it to consider such an option. The council, like many other leaders among the Arab citizens, called on the Palestinian Authority to refrain from negotiating this issue with Israel (ibid.).

Homeland nationalism was a main argument raised by many others who oppose this plan. The expressed indignity of being treated as pawns in the Israeli state’s settler-colonial dealings is rooted in this community’s deep sense of connection and claim to their own homeland.
Conclusion: homeland nationalism, resistance, and the return of history

This paper demonstrates how the colonized invoke homeland nationalism in the face of constant and innumerable indignities—perhaps most potent of which is the colonizers’ denial of the indigenous population’s relationship to and ownership of their homeland. Political, discursive, and daily acts of resistance—not necessarily through violence, as Fanon would argue—is how the colonized maintain their dignity in a system that sees and treats them as unequal or less than human; excludes them socially, politically, and economically; and practices structural and physical violence against them (Fanon 1963). What is interesting in the case of the Palestinian citizens of Israel is the way they have managed to maintain their dignity while not being part of the Palestinian National Movement and therefore not participating in the Palestinian resistance as embodied by the PLO—the Palestine Liberation Organization—or any of its organs, since that particular type of resistance began in the late 1960s. Indeed, as early as 1980, Ian Lustick (1980) asked, why are the Arab citizens of Israel acquiescent? But it seems that the Palestinian citizens developed their own modes of resistance: maintaining the Palestinian narrative precisely in the part of Palestine that was to be transformed to its negation and in the face of all attempts of cultural and political erasure (see Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury in press).

Maintaining a narrative that negates Zionism and threatens it by simply being articulated and voiced—while subjected to conditions of defeat, national destruction, and military rule lasting for a whole generation after 1948—has not been an easy task; it however, is an achievement without which the Palestinian citizens’ identity and dignity could have been permanently impaired. How this was accomplished is still an open question, but it should be noted that the Arab citizens remained part of the Arab world, even if hermetically isolated from it (or ‘quarantined’, as Anton Shammas [1988] has described it). Their nation, though largely ethnically cleansed, was not eliminated, and they followed and internalized the heroism of the Palestinian resistance arising outside the new state, even if they were not active participants in it.

A main component of the Palestinian narrative is that Palestinians are the indigenous people of Palestine—their homeland—and that Zionist colonizers took over this land. While the emphasis on homeland and colonialism subsided among Palestinians since the mid-1970s for decades when they hopelessly tried to achieve a two-state solution, the anti-colonial consciousness has recently been returning with full force among all Palestinians, but particularly among the Palestinians in Israel. This is because, I believe, not only does the Zionist state exclude them from the state, but it also denies and rejects even their relationship to their own homeland, in addition of course to the influence of the broader Palestinian nationalism. The examples I
presented and the reactions to them support the centrality of homeland nationalism in the Palestinian response to the Zionist state’s policies and attitudes; but they also reflect a powerful trend among the Palestinians in which the whole Palestinian homeland is becoming central. Homeland nationalism allows Palestinian citizens to politically reclaim their homeland, express their canonical historical facts and their ownership of and rootedness in their homeland, and maintain their dignity and resist colonization. Consequently it can shape how they view their present relationship with the colonizer and with the homeland and how to envision the future of these relationships.

Nadim Rouhana is Professor of International Affairs and Conflict Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and Founding Director of Mada al-Carmel—The Arab Center for Applied Social Research in Haifa.

Notes

i The question of ‘triumph’ requires further discussion that is beyond the scope of this paper. But the literature is not in agreement about the Israeli case. Veracini (2013), for example considers Israel in the 1948 territories (unlike in 1967 territories) a successful case of a settler society. One major indication of success for Veracini is when the project extinguishes itself in the sense that settlers become ‘natives’ with normal position.

ii Mamdani (2015) uses the term American Indians rather than Native Americans because of the reluctance of this population to use the former term as it implies being a part of the American political community. This is similar to the reluctance of the Palestinian citizens of Israel to incorporate the term ‘Israeli’ into their self-identification for similar reasons (see Rouhana 1997).

iii Video of the broadcast is available online, see Theseventheye (2015). Translated summaries of the relevant portions are available in Persico (2015).

iv I use the terms ‘Arab citizens’ and ‘Palestinian citizens’ interchangeably to refer to the same group of Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel.

v Indeed, a negligible group within the Druze community in Israel established what it calls the Druze Zionist Movement, which adopts Zionism as its ideology and supports the idea that Israel should be the state of the Jewish people (see Nisan 2010).

vi Although I consider Israel an ongoing settler-colonial project and the settlements in the West Bank as an extension of this project, the settlers in the West Bank are violating international law, while the immigrants to Israel are not. Nonetheless, they do become beneficiaries of the Zionist settler-colonial privileges when they make aliyah.
See, for example, Algazi’s (2010) argument against applying this term to the Bedouin. See also Amara et al. 2013.

Here is how the Jewish Agency describes the Galilee mitzvim: ‘They parallel another development in the settlement field in a very different, less controversial, area within Israel: this is the Galilee, where Jewish population was sparse and where new initiatives to enhance it were unfolded in the late 1970s. ... There was a large Arab population that had stayed in place in 1948 and had ultimately been included in the post-war Jewish State. ... Occasional discomfort had been expressed over the situation through the years; Menachem Begin’s first government decided that the time had come to act. A plan was developed for a series of settlements, called mitzvim (lookouts), to be placed on the higher topographical points of the areas defined as priorities’ (Jewish Agency for Israel n.d.).

According to the Israel Bureau of Statistics (2015), the number of Jews in Israel at the end of 2014 was 6,160,700 constituting 75% of the population. In the same year, the number of Arabs was given as 1,701,500 (21% of the population). But the number of Arabs includes Palestinians (mostly noncitizens in occupied East Jerusalem) and Syrian Arabs in the occupied Golan Heights, the total of which in 2013 was 343,000.

The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality has at its center the Israeli Communist Party. Its first candidate, Ayman Odeh, became the first candidate on the joint Arab list that is a coalition of three Arab parties and Odeh’s party.

See Old News 2015. Reviewing several of the interactions between Arab Knesset members (or candidates to the Knesset) and others in the Knesset or their interaction with Israeli interviewers on TV, I have identified a number of strategies that the Arab members use. These strategies are not thought out. Rather, they are naturally applied to shield against colonial indignities. First they take the upper moral ground by invoking universal values that their political parties espouse, in particular equality, democracy, state for all its citizens, and social justice; second, they use theatrical acts in the Knesset and subtle plays on language to belittle their opponents who use indignant language; third, they resort to their indigeneity, which is in effect the most fundamental way the native can face settler indignities. In this paper, because I chose to focus on a usually overlooked indignity—that which originates from expropriating the relationship of the indigenous people with their homeland—I highlight the most powerful shielding strategy, that of invoking indigeneity.

See video on YouTube, ‘Arab Israeli parliamentarian, Zahalka, doesn’t recognize Tel Aviv’ (Rock n Roll 2010).

See exchange on videotape by Channel 2 News 2006; see also Marciano 2006. Bishara has written extensively on the relationship to the homeland and in one case he had summarized the status of the Arabs in Israel as follows: ‘In 1948 we lost a country and gained citizenship (Quoted in Robinson 2013, p. 68).
Strictly speaking, one of the three ‘Arab parties’—the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality—is a joint Jewish-Arab party, but it is dominated by Arab leadership and a vast Arab majority constituency.

A survey on the impact of Arab parliamentary participation on Israel’s policy toward its Arab citizens, revealed that about two-thirds of Arab citizens believed that Arab Knesset members have no influence on Israel’s policies towards the Arab citizens and that only 11% believed they can influence these policies. In workshops to discuss the data, many Arab parliamentarians agreed with these data. (Unpublished survey research data, 2014, Mada al-Carmel—Arab Center for Applied Social Research, Haifa, www.mada-research.org)

See Knesset Proceedings, Session 41, 14th Knesset, November 20, 1996 (Urgent proposals for the agenda: a proposal by Labor and Likud representatives that Umm Al Fahm and the Small Triangle Area be transferred to the Palestinian Authority in exchange of Israeli sovereignty in the settlements).

See, for example, MK Mohamad Barakeh’s statement about Lieberman’s plan: ‘We were here before he arrived in this land, and we will be here after he has disappeared politically’ (quoted in Myre 2006).

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